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Who knows what I want to do? Who knows what anyone wants to do? How can you
be sure about something like that? Isn’t it all a question of brain chemistry, signals
going back and forth, electrical energy in the cortex? How do you know whether
something is really what you want to do or just some kind of nerve impulse in the
brain. Some minor little activity takes place somewhere in this unimportant place in
one of the brain hemispheres and suddenly I want to go to Montana or I don’t want
to go to Montana. (White Noise, Don DeLillo)
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1. Introduction
In the last two decades, following almost a
century of separation, economics has begun
to import insights from psychology.
“Behavioral economics” is now a prominent
fixture on the intellectual landscape and has
spawned applications to topics in economics,
such as finance, game theory, labor econom-
ics, public finance, law, and macroeconomics
(see Colin Camerer and George Loewenstein
2004). Behavioral economics has mostly been
informed by a branch of psychology called
“behavioral decision research,” but other
cognitive sciences are ripe for harvest. Some
important insights will surely come from neu-
roscience, either directly or because neuro-
science will reshape what is believed about
psychology which in turn informs economics.
Neuroscience uses imaging of brain activity
and other techniques to infer details about
how the brain works. The brain is the ultimate
“black box.” The foundations of economic
theory were constructed assuming that details
about the functioning of the brain’s black box
would not be known. This pessimism was
expressed by William Jevons in 1871:
I hesitate to say that men will ever have the means
of measuring directly the feelings of the human
heart. It is from the quantitative effects of the
feelings that we must estimate their comparative
amounts.
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Since feelings were meant to predict behav-
ior but could only be assessed from behavior,
economists realized that, without direct
measurement, feelings were useless inter-
vening constructs. In the 1940s, the con-
cepts of ordinal utility and revealed
preference eliminated the superfluous inter-
mediate step of positing immeasurable feel-
ings. Revealed preference theory simply
equates unobserved preferences with
observed choices. Circularity is avoided by
assuming that people behave consistently,
which makes the theory falsifiable; once
they have revealed that they prefer A to B,
people should not subsequently choose B
over A. Later extensions—discounted,
expected, and subjective expected utility,
and Bayesian updating—provided similar
“as if” tools which sidestepped psychological
detail. The “as if” approach made good
sense as long as the brain remained substan-
tially a black box. The development of eco-
nomics could not be held hostage to
progress in other human sciences.
But now neuroscience has proved
Jevons’s pessimistic prediction wrong; the
study of the brain and nervous system is
beginning to allow direct measurement of
thoughts and feelings. These measurements
are, in turn, challenging our understanding
of the relation between mind and action,
leading to new theoretical constructs and
calling old ones into question. How can the
new findings of neuroscience, and the theo-
ries they have spawned, inform an econom-
ic theory that developed so impressively in
their absence?
In thinking about the ways that neuro-
science can inform economics, it is useful to
distinguish two types of contributions, which
we term incremental and radical approach-
es. In the incremental approach, neuro-
science adds variables to conventional
accounts of decision making or suggests spe-
cific functional forms to replace “as if ”
assumptions that have never been well sup-
ported empirically. For example, research on
the neurobiology of addiction suggests how
drug consumption limits pleasure from
future consumption of other goods (dynam-
ic cross-partial effects in utility for commod-
ity bundles) and how environmental cues
trigger unpleasant craving and increase
demand. These effects can be approximated
by extending standard theory and then
applying conventional tools (see Douglas
Bernheim and Antonio Rangel 2004; David
Laibson 2001; Ted O’Donoghue and
Matthew Rabin 1997).
The radical approach involves turning
back the hands of time and asking how eco-
nomics might have evolved differently if it
had been informed from the start by insights
and findings now available from neuro-
science. Neuroscience, we will argue, points
to an entirely new set of constructs to under-
lie economic decision making. The standard
economic theory of constrained utility maxi-
mization is most naturally interpreted either
as the result of learning based on consump-
tion experiences (which is of little help when
prices, income, and opportunity sets
change), or careful deliberation—a balanc-
ing of the costs and benefits of different
options—as might characterize complex
decisions like planning for retirement, buy-
ing a house, or hammering out a contract.
Although economists may privately acknowl-
edge that actual flesh-and-blood human
beings often choose without much delibera-
tion, the economic models as written invari-
ably represent decisions in a “deliberative
equilibrium,” i.e., that are at a stage where
further deliberation, computation, reflec-
tion, etc. would not by itself alter the agent’s
choice. The variables that enter into the for-
mulation of the decision problem—the pref-
erences, information, and constraints—are
precisely the variables that should affect the
decision, if the person had unlimited time
and computing ability.
While not denying that deliberation is part
of human decision making, neuroscience
points out two generic inadequacies of this
approach—its inability to handle the crucial
roles of automatic and emotional processing.
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First, much of the brain implements
“automatic” processes, which are faster than
conscious deliberations and which occur
with little or no awareness or feeling of effort
(John Bargh et al. 1996; Bargh and Tanya
Chartrand 1999; Walter Schneider and
Richard Shiffrin 1977; Shiffrin and
Schneider 1977). Because people have little
or no introspective access to these processes,
or volitional control over them, and these
processes were evolved to solve problems of
evolutionary importance rather than respect
logical dicta, the behavior these processes
generate need not follow normative axioms
of inference and choice.
Second, our behavior is strongly influ-
enced by finely tuned affective (emotion)
systems whose basic design is common to
humans and many animals (Joseph LeDoux
1996; Jaak Panksepp 1998; Edmund Rolls
1999). These systems are essential for daily
functioning, and when they are damaged or
perturbed, by brain injury, stress, imbal-
ances in neurotransmitters, or the “heat of
the moment,” the logical-deliberative sys-
tem—even if completely intact—cannot
regulate behavior appropriately.
Human behavior thus requires a fluid
interaction between controlled and automat-
ic processes, and between cognitive and
affective systems. However, many behaviors
that emerge from this interplay are routine-
ly and falsely interpreted as being the prod-
uct of cognitive deliberation alone (George
Wolford, Michael Miller, and Michael
Gazzaniga 2000). These results (some of
which are described below) suggest that
introspective accounts of the basis for choice
should be taken with a grain of salt. Because
automatic processes are designed to keep
behavior “off-line” and below consciousness,
we have far more introspective access to
controlled than to automatic processes.
Since we see only the top of the automatic
iceberg, we naturally tend to exaggerate the
importance of control.
Neuroscience findings and methods will
undoubtedly play an increasingly prominent
1 The first meeting was held at Carnegie Mellon in
1997. Later meetings were held in Arizona and
Princeton, in 2001, in Minnesota in 2002, and on
Martha’s Vineyard in 2003 and Kiawah Island in 2004.
Occasional sessions devoted to this rapidly growing topic
are now common at large annual meetings in both 
economics and neuroscience.
role in economics and other social sciences
(e.g., law, Terrence Chorvat, Kevin McCabe,
and Vernon Smith 2004). Indeed, a new area
of economics that has been branded “neu-
roeconomics” has already formed the basis
of numerous academic gatherings that have
brought neuroscientists and economists
together (see also Paul Zak, in press).1
Participating in the development of a shared
intellectual enterprise will help us ensure
that the neuroscience informs economic
questions we care about. Stimulated by the
authors’ own participation in a number of
such meetings, our goal in this paper is to
describe what neuroscientists do and how
their discoveries and views of human behav-
ior might inform economic analysis. In the
next section (2), we describe the diversity of
tools that neuroscientists use. Section 3
introduces a simplified account of how cog-
nition and affect on the one hand, and auto-
matic and controlled processes on the other,
work separately, and interact. Section 4 dis-
cusses general implications for economics.
Section 5 goes into greater detail about
implications of neuroeconomics for four top-
ics in economics: intertemporal choice, deci-
sion making under risk, game theory, and
labor-market discrimination. Through most
of the paper, our focus is largely on how neu-
roscience can inform models of microfoun-
dations of individual decision making.
Section 6 discusses some broader macro
implications and concludes.
2. Neuroscience Methods
Scientific technologies are not just tools
scientists use to explore areas of interest.
New tools also define new scientific fields
and erase old boundaries. The telescope cre-
ated astronomy by elevating the science from
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pure cosmological speculation. The micro-
scope made possible similar advances in biol-
ogy. The same is true of economics. Its
boundaries have been constantly reshaped by
tools such as mathematical, econometric, and
simulation methods. Likewise, the current
surge of interest in neuroscience by psychol-
ogists emerged largely from new methods,
and the methods may productively blur the
boundaries of economics and psychology.
This section reviews some of these methods.
2.1 Brain Imaging
Brain imaging is currently the most popu-
lar neuroscientific tool. Most brain imaging
involves a comparison of people performing
different tasks—an “experimental” task and
a “control” task. The difference between
images taken while subject is performing the
two tasks provides a picture of regions of the
brain that are differentially activated by the
experimental task.
There are three basic imaging methods.
The oldest, electro-encephalogram (or EEG)
uses electrodes attached to the scalp to meas-
ure electrical activity synchronized to stimu-
lus events or behavioral responses (known as
Event Related Potentials or ERPs). Like
EEG, positron emission topography (PET)
scanning is an old technique in the rapidly
changing time-frame of neuroscience, but is
still a useful technique. PET measures blood
flow in the brain, which is a reasonable proxy
for neural activity, since neural activity in a
region leads to increased blood flow to that
region. The newest, and currently most pop-
ular, imaging method is functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI), which tracks
blood flow in the brain using changes in mag-
netic properties due to blood oxygenation
(the “BOLD signal”). Simultaneous direct
recording of neural processing and fMRI
responses confirms that the BOLD signal
reflects input to neurons and their processing
(Nikos Logothetis et al. 2001).
Although fMRI is increasingly becoming
the method of choice, each method has 
pros and cons. EEG has excellent temporal
resolution (on the order of one millisecond)
and is the only method used with humans
that directly monitors neural activity, as
opposed to, e.g., blood flow. But spatial reso-
lution is poor and it can only measure activi-
ty in the outer part of the brain. EEG
resolution has, however, been improving
through the use of ever-increasing numbers
of electrodes. Interpolation methods, and the
combined use of EEG and fMRI for measur-
ing outer-brain signals and inner-brain sig-
nals at the same time, promise to create
statistical methods which make reasonable
inferences about activity throughout the
brain from EEG signals. For economics, a
major advantage of EEG is its relative unob-
trusiveness and portability. Portability will
eventually reach the point where it will be
possible to take unobtrusive measurements
from people as they go about their daily
affairs. PET and fMRI provide better spatial
resolution than EEG, but poorer temporal
resolution because blood-flow to neurally
active areas occurs with a stochastic lag from
a few seconds (fMRI) to a minute (PET).
Brain imaging still provides only a crude
snapshot of brain activity. Neural processes
are thought to occur on a 0.1 millimeter
scale in 100 milliseconds (msec), but the
spatial and temporal resolution of a typical
scanner is only 3 millimeters and several sec-
onds. Multiple trials per subject can be aver-
aged to form composite images, but doing so
constrains experimental design. However,
the technology has improved rapidly and will
continue to improve. Hybrid techniques that
combine the strengths of different methods
are particularly promising. Techniques for
simultaneously scanning multiple brains
(“hyperscanning”) have also been developed,
which can be used to study multiple-brain-
level differences in activity in games and
markets (Read Montague et al. 2002).
2.2 Single-Neuron Measurement
Even the finest-grained brain imaging
techniques only measure activity of “cir-
cuits” consisting of thousands of neurons. In
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single neuron measurement, tiny electrodes
are inserted into the brain, each measuring a
single neuron’s firing. As we discuss below,
single neuron measurement studies have
produced some striking findings that, we
believe, are relevant to economics. A limita-
tion of single neuron measurement is that,
because insertion of the wires damages 
neurons, it is largely restricted to animals.
Studying animals is informative about
humans because many brain structures and
functions of non-human mammals are simi-
lar to those of humans (e.g., we are more
genetically similar to many species of mon-
keys than those species are to other species).
Neuroscientists commonly divide the brain
into crude regions that reflect a combination
of evolutionary development, functions, and
physiology. The most common, triune divi-
sion draws a distinction between the “reptil-
ian brain,” which is responsible for basic
survival functions, such as breathing, sleep-
ing, eating, the “mammalian brain,” which
encompasses neural units associated with
social emotions, and the “hominid” brain,
which is unique to humans and includes
much of our oversized cortex—the thin, fold-
ed, layer covering the brain that is responsi-
ble for such “higher” functions as language,
consciousness and long-term planning (Paul
MacLean 1990). Because single neuron
measurement is largely restricted to nonhu-
man animals, it has so far shed far more light
on the basic emotional and motivational
processes that humans share with other
mammals than on higher-level processes
such as language and consciousness.
2.3 Electrical Brain Stimulation (EBS)
Electrical brain stimulation is another
method that is largely restricted to animals.
In 1954, two psychologists (James Olds and
Peter Milner 1954) discovered that rats
would learn and execute novel behaviors if
rewarded by brief pulses of electrical brain
stimulation (EBS) to certain sites in the
brain. Rats (and many other vertebrates,
including humans) will work hard for EBS.
For a big series of EBS pulses, rats will leap
over hurdles, cross electrified grids, and
forego their only daily opportunities to eat,
drink, or mate. Animals also trade EBS off
against smaller rewards in a sensible fash-
ion—e.g., they demand more EBS to forego
food when they are hungry. Unlike more
naturalistic rewards, EBS does not satiate.
And electrical brain stimulation at specific
sites often elicits behaviors such as eating,
drinking (Joseph Mendelson 1967), or copu-
lation (Anthony Caggiula and Bartley
Hoebel 1966). Many abused drugs, such as
cocaine, amphetamine, heroin, cannabis,
and nicotine, lower the threshold at which
animals will lever-press for EBS (Roy Wise
1996). Despite its obvious applications to
economics, only a few studies have explored
substitutability of EBS and other reinforcers
(Steven Hursh and B. H. Natelson; Leonard
Green and Howard Rachlin 1991; Peter
Shizgal 1999).
2.4 Psychopathology and Brain Damage in
Humans
Chronic mental illnesses (e.g., schizophre-
nia), developmental disorders (e.g., autism),
degenerative diseases of the nervous system,
and accidents and strokes that damage local-
ized brain regions help us understand how
the brain works (e.g., Antonio Damasio
1994). When patients with known damage to
an area X perform a special task more poor-
ly than “normal” patients, and do other tasks
equally well, one can infer that area X is used
to do the special task. Patients who have
undergone neurosurgical procedures such as
lobotomy (used in the past to treat depres-
sion) or radical bisection of the brain (an
extreme remedy for epilepsy, now rarely
used) have also provided valuable data (see
Walter Freeman and James Watts 1942;
Gazzaniga and LeDoux 1978).
Finally, a relatively new method called
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)
uses pulsed magnetic fields to temporarily
disrupt brain function in specific regions.
The difference in cognitive and behavioral
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functioning that results from such disrup-
tions provides clues about which regions
control which neural functions. The theoret-
ical advantage of TMS over brain imaging is
that TMS directly leads to causal inferences
about brain functioning rather than the
purely associational evidence provided by
imaging techniques. Unfortunately, the use
of TMS is currently limited to the cortex (it
is particularly useful for studying visual
processes in the occipital lobe, in the back of
the head). It is also controversial because it
can cause seizures and may have other bad
long-run effects.
2.5 Psychophysical Measurement
An old and simple technique is measure-
ment of psychophysiological indicators like
heart rate, blood pressure, galvanic skin
response (GSR, sweating in the palms), and
pupil dilation (pupils dilate in response to
arousal, including monetary reward). These
measurements are easy, not too obtrusive,
portable, and very rapid in time. The draw-
back is that measurements can fluctuate for
many reasons (e.g., body movement) and
many different combinations of emotions
lead to similar psychophysiological output,
just as being pulled over by a cop and meet-
ing a blind date may produce very similar
emotional anxiety responses. Often these
measurements are useful in combination
with other techniques or in lesion patients
who are likely to have very different physio-
logical reactions (e.g., sociopaths do not
show normal GSR fear reactions before a
possible monetary loss). Facial musculature
can also be measured by attaching small
electrodes to smiling muscles (on the 
cheekbones) and frowning muscles (between
the eyebrows).
2.6 Diffusion Tensor Imaging (DTI)
Diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) is a new
technique which exploits the fact that water
flows rapidly though myleinated (sheathed)
neural axons (Dennis Bihan et al. 2001).
Imaging the water flow can therefore reveal
the trajectories which project from one neu-
ral region to others (like watching patterns
of car traffic from a helicopter can tell you
roughly the ebb and flow of economic and
social activity). Knowing where a region’s
neurons project is extremely useful in
understanding neural circuitry and is an
important complement to simply imaging
activity in multiple regions (using fMRI)
with little ability to pin down which activity
occurs earliest. Furthermore, the technique
can be used after autopsies, which is an
obvious advantage.
2.7 Is Neuroscience Just About Where
Things Happen in the Brain?
Neuroscience is sometimes criticized as
providing little more than a picture of
“where things happen in the brain” or, more
cynically, as simply showing that behavior is
caused by action in the nervous system
(which was never in doubt). Indeed, some
neuroscientists who are purely interested in
the functionality of different brain regions
would endorse such a characterization
unapologetically.
However, the long-run goal of neuro-
science is to provide more than a map of the
mind. By tracking what parts of the brain
are activated by different tasks, and espe-
cially by looking for overlap between
diverse tasks, neuroscientists are gaining an
understanding of what different parts of the
brain do, how the parts interact in “circuit-
ry,” and, hence, how the brain solves differ-
ent types of problems. For example,
because different parts of the brain are
more or less associated with affective or
cognitive processing (a distinction we
define more precisely below), imaging peo-
ple while they are doing different types of
economic tasks provides important clues
about the mix of affective and cognitive
processes in those tasks. For example,
Sanfey et al. (2003) find that the insula cor-
tex—a region in the temporal lobe that
encodes bodily sensations like pain and
odor disgust—is active when people receive
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low offers in an ultimatum bargaining
game. This means that even if rejecting a
low offer is done because of an adapted
instinct to build up a reputation for tough-
ness (in order to get more in the future),
the circuitry that encodes this instinct clear-
ly has an affective component, which is not
purely cognitive.
For neuroeconomists, knowing more
about functional specialization, and how
regions collaborate in different tasks, could
substitute familiar distinctions between cat-
egories of economic behavior (sometimes
established arbitrarily by suggestions which
become modeling conventions) with new
ones grounded in neural detail. For exam-
ple, the insula activity noted by Sanfey et al.
in bargaining is also present when subjects
playing matrix games are asked to guess
what other subjects think they will do (sec-
ond-order beliefs) (see Meghana Bhatt and
Camerer, in press). This suggests that maybe
the subjects who receive low offers in the
ultimatum study are not disgusted, they are
simply evaluating a second-order belief
about what proposers expect them to do, as
an input into an emotional evaluation. This is
just a speculation, of course, but it shows
how direct understanding of neural circuitry
can inspire theorizing and the search for
new data.
In light of the long list of methods
reviewed earlier in this section, it is also
worth emphasizing that neuroscience isn’t
only about brain imaging. Brain lesion stud-
ies (as well as TMS) allow one to examine
the impact of disabling specific parts of the
brain. They have often provided clearer evi-
dence on functionality of specific brain
regions—even with tiny sample sizes from
rare types of damage—than imaging meth-
ods have. Single neuron measurement pro-
vides information not just about what parts
of the brain “light up,” but about the specif-
ic conditions that cause specific neurons to
fire at accelerated or decelerated rates. And
electrical brain stimulation, though it is
largely off limits to studies involving
humans, provides a level of experimental
control that economists conducting field
research should envy.
As always, “the proof is in the pudding.”
Here, our goal is not to review the many
ways in which neuroscience will rapidly
change economic theory, because that is not
where we are yet. Our goal is to showcase
some key findings in neuroscience, and stim-
ulate the reader’s curiosity about what these
findings might mean for economics.
3. Basic Lessons from Neuroscience
Because most of these techniques involve
localization of brain activity, this can easily
foster a misperception that neuroscience is
merely developing a “geography of the
brain,” a map of which brain bits do what
part of the job. If that were indeed so, then
there would be little reason for economists
to pay attention. In reality, however, neuro-
science is beginning to use regional activity
differences and other clues to elucidate the
principles of brain organization and func-
tioning, which in turn, is radically changing
our understanding of how the brain works.
Our goal in this section is to highlight some
of the findings from neuroscience that may
prove relevant to economics.
3.1 A Two-Dimensional Theoretical
Framework
Our organizing theme, depicted in Table 1,
emphasizes the two distinctions mentioned
in the introduction, between controlled and
automatic processes, and between cognition
and affect.
3.1.1 Automatic and Controlled Processes
The distinction between automatic and
controlled processes was first proposed by
Schneider and Shiffrin (1977). Many others
have developed similar two-system models
since then, with different labels: rule-based
and associative (Steven Sloman 1996);
rational and experiential systems (Lee
Kirkpatrick and Seymour Epstein 1992);
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TABLE 1
TWO DIMENSIONS OF NEURAL FUNCTIONING
Cognitive Affective
Controlled Processes
■ serial
■ effortful
■ evoked deliberately I II
■ good introspective
access
Automatic Processes
■ parallel
■ effortless
■ reflexive III IV
■ no introspective
access
2 Elaborate methods have been developed that maxi-
mize the validity of such “verbal protocols” (see, e.g.,
Herbert Simon).
reflective and reflexive (Matthew
Lieberman et al. 2002); deliberative and
implementive systems (Peter Gollwitzer,
Kentaro Fujita, and Gabriele Oettingen
2004); assessment and locomotion (Arie
Kruglanski et al. 2000), and type I and type
II processes (Daniel Kahneman and Shane
Frederick 2002).
Controlled processes, as described by the
two rows of Table 1, are serial (they use
step-by-step logic or computations), tend to
be invoked deliberately by the agent when
her or she encounters a challenge or sur-
prise (Reid Hastie 1984), and are often
associated with a subjective feeling of
effort. People can typically provide a good
introspective account of controlled process-
es. Thus, if asked how they solved a math
problem or choose a new car, they can
often recall the considerations and the
steps leading up to the choice.2 Standard
tools of economics, such as decision trees
and dynamic programming, can be viewed
as stylized representations of controlled
processes.
3 The brain’s ability to recover from environmental
damage is also facilitated by a property called plasticity. In
one study that illustrates the power of plasticity, the optic
nerves of ferrets (which are born when they are still at a
relatively immature state of development when the brain is
still highly plastic) were disconnected at birth and recon-
nected to the auditory cortex (the portion of the brain that
processes sound). The ferrets learned to “see” using audi-
tory cortex, and some neurons in their auditory cortex
actually took on the physical characteristics of neurons in
the visual cortex (Lauire von Melchner, Sarah Pallas, and
Mriganka Sur 2000).
Automatic processes are the opposite of
controlled processes on each of these
dimensions— they operate in parallel, are
not accessible to consciousness, and are
relatively effortless. Parallelism facilitates
rapid response, allows for massive multi-
tasking, and gives the brain remarkable
power when it comes to certain types of
tasks, such as visual identification.
Parallelism also provides redundancy that
decreases the brain’s vulnerability to injury.
When neurons are progressively destroyed
in a region, the consequences are typically
gradual rather than sudden (“graceful
degradation”).3 “Connectionist” neural net-
work models formulated by cognitive psy-
chologists (David Rumelhart and James
McClelland 1986) capture these features
and have been applied to many domains,
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Figure 1. The human brain with some economically relevant areas marked.
including commercial ones. Models of this
type have a very different structure from
the systems of equations that economists
typically work with. Unlike systems of
equations, they are “black-box”; it is hard to
intuit what they are doing by looking at
individual parameters.
Because automatic processes are not
accessible to consciousness, people often
have surprisingly little introspective insight
into why automatic choices or judgments
were made. A face is perceived as “attrac-
tive” or a verbal remark as “sarcastic” auto-
matically and effortlessly. It is only later
that the controlled system may reflect on
the judgment and attempt to substantiate it
logically, and when it does, it often does so
spuriously (e.g., Timothy Wilson, Samuel
Lindsey, and Tonya Schooler 2000).
Automatic and controlled processes can
be roughly distinguished by where they
occur in the brain (Lieberman et al. 2002).
Regions that support cognitive automatic
activity are concentrated in the back (occip-
ital), top (parietal), and side (temporal)
parts of the brain (see Figure 1). The amyg-
dala, buried below the cortex, is responsible
for many important automatic affective
responses, especially fear. Controlled
processes occur mainly in the front (orbital
and prefrontal) parts of the brain. The pre-
frontal cortex (pFC) is sometimes called the
“executive” region, because it draws inputs
from almost all other regions, integrates
them to form near and long-term goals, and
plans actions that take these goals into
account (Timothy Shallice and Paul
Burgess 1996). The prefrontal area is the
Somato-
sensory
Visual
cortexAutomatic
affect
Cognitive
control
“interrupt
Brodmann”10
L insula R insula
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4 As David Laibson and Andrew Caplin, respectively,
have aptly expressed it.
region that has grown the most in the
course of human evolution and which,
therefore, most sharply differentiates us
from our closest primate relatives (Stephen
Manuck et al. 2003).
Automatic processes—whether cognitive
or affective—are the default mode of brain
operation. They whir along all the time,
even when we dream, constituting most of
the electro-chemical activity in the brain.
Controlled processes occur at special
moments when automatic processes become
“interrupted,” which happens when a per-
son encounters unexpected events, experi-
ences strong visceral states, or is presented
with some kind of explicit challenge in the
form of a novel decision or other type of
problem. To the degree that controlled
processes are well described by economic
calculation but parallel processes are not,
one could say that economics is about the
“interrupt” or “override.” 4
3.1.2 Affective and Cognitive Processes
The second distinction, represented by
the two columns of table 1, is between
affective and cognitive processes. Such a
distinction is pervasive in contemporary
psychology (e.g., Robert Zajonc 1980, 1984,
1998; Zajonc and Daniel McIntosh 1992)
and neuroscience (Damasio 1994; LeDoux
1996; Panksepp 1998), and has an historical
lineage going back to the ancient Greeks
and earlier (Plato described people as driv-
ing a chariot drawn by two horses, reason
and passions).
The distinguishing features of affective
processing are somewhat counterintuitive.
Most people undoubtedly associate affect
with feeling states, and indeed most affect
states do produce feeling states when they
reach a threshold level of intensity.
However, most affect probably operates
below the threshold of conscious awareness
5 By this definition, neural processes that don’t have
valence are not affects. There are also neural processes
that produce actions that are not best defined as affects –
e.g., the reflexes that cause you to draw away from a hot
object or an electric shock.
(LeDoux 1996; Piotr Winkielman and Kent
Berridge 2004). As Rita Carter (1999) com-
ments, “the conscious appreciation of emo-
tion is looking more and more like one
quite small, and sometimes inessential, ele-
ment of a system of survival mechanisms
that mainly operate—even in adults—at an
unconscious level.”
For most affect researchers, the central
feature of affect is not the feeling states asso-
ciated with it, but its role in human motiva-
tion. All affects have “valence”—they are
either positive or negative (though some
complex emotions, such as “bittersweet,”
can combine more basic emotions that have
opposing valences). Many also carry “action
tendencies” (Nico Frijda 1986; Leonard
Berkowitz 1999)—e.g., anger motivates us to
aggress, pain to take steps to ease the pain,
and fear to escape or in some cases to
freeze—as well as diverse other effects on
sensory perception, memory, preferences,
and so on (see, e.g., Leda Cosmides and
John Tooby 2004). Affective processes,
according to Zajonc’s (1998) definition, are
those that address “go/no-go” questions—
that motivate approach or avoidance behav-
ior. Cognitive processes, in contrast, are
those that answer true/false questions.5
Though it is not essential to our overall argu-
ment, our view is that cognition by itself can-
not produce action; to influence behavior,
the cognitive system must operate via the
affective system.
Affect, as we use the term, embodies not
only emotions such as anger, fear, and jeal-
ousy, but also drive states such as hunger,
thirst and sexual desire, and motivational
states such as physical pain, discomfort
(e.g., nausea) and drug craving. Ross Buck
(1999) refers to these latter influences as
“biological affects,” which he distinguishes
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6 The researchers scanned the brains of subjects using
fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) as they
played a video game designed to produce a feeling of social
rejection. Subjects thought they were playing a game that
involved throwing a ball back and forth with two other
people, but in fact the computer controlled the two ani-
mated figures that they saw on the screen. After a period
of three-way play, the two other “players” began to exclude
the subjects by throwing the ball back and forth between
themselves. The social snub triggered neural activity in a
part of the brain called the anterior cingulate cortex, which
also processes physical pain, and the insula, which is active
during physical and social discomfort.
from the more traditional “social affects.”
Affect, thus, coincides closely with the his-
torical concept of the passions. Although
emotions such as anger and fear might
seem qualitatively different than the bio-
logical affects, they have more in common
that might be supposed. Thus, a recent
study showed that hurt feelings activated
the same brain regions activated by broken
bones or other physical injuries (Naomi
Eisenberger et al. 2003).6
3.1.3 The Quadrants in Action: An
Illustration
These two dimensions, in combination,
define four quadrants (labeled I to IV in
Table 1). Quadrant I is in charge when you
deliberate about whether to refinance your
house, poring over present-value calcula-
tions; quadrant II is undoubtedly the rarest
in pure form. It is used by “method actors”
who imagine previous emotional experi-
ences so as to actually experience those
emotions during a performance; quadrant
III governs the movement of your hand as
you return serve; and quadrant IV makes
you jump when somebody says “Boo!”
Most behavior results from the interac-
tion of all four quadrants. A natural instinct
of economists trained in parsimonious
modeling is to think that cognition is typi-
cally controlled, and affect is automatic, so
there are really only two dimensions
(quadrants I and IV) rather than four. But
a lot of cognitive processing is automatic as
well—e.g., visual perception or language
7 For example, when people are shown unpleasant pho-
tographs and told to interpret the photos so that they don’t
experience negative emotions (e.g., imagine a picture of
women crying as having been taken at a wedding), there is
less activity in the insula and amygdala, emotional areas,
and in medial orbitofrontal cortex, and area which the
insula projects to (Kevin Ochsner et al., in press).
processing. Research on “emotional regu-
lation” shows many ways that cognition
influences emotion, which implies the
capacity for controlling emotion.7
The four-quadrant model is just a way to
remind readers that the cognitive–affective
and controlled–automatic dimensions are
not perfectly correlated, and to provide a
broad view to guide exploratory research.
For some purposes, reducing the two
dimensions to one, or the four quadrants to
two, will certainly be useful. Furthermore,
noting all four cells is not a claim that all are
equally important. It is just a suggestion that
leaving out one of the combinations would
lead to a model which is incomplete for
some purposes.
Consider what happens when a party host
approaches you with a plate of sushi.
Quadrant III: Your first task is to figure
out what is on the plate. The occipital cor-
tex in the back of the brain is the first on the
scene, drawing in signals from your eyes via
your optic nerves. It decodes the sushi into
primitive patterns such as lines and corners
then uses a “cascading process” to discern
larger shapes (Stephen Kosslyn 1994).
Further downstream, in the inferior tempo-
ral visual cortex (ITVC), this information
becomes integrated with stored representa-
tions of objects, which permits you to rec-
ognize the objects on the plate as sushi. This
latter process is extraordinarily complicated
(and has proved difficult for artificial intelli-
gence researchers to recreate in computers)
because objects can take so many forms,
orientations, and sizes.
Quadrant IV: This is where affect enters
the picture. Neurons in the inferior tempo-
ral visual cortex are sensitive only to the
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identity of an object; they don’t tell you
whether it will taste good. Outputs of the
inferior temporal visual cortex as well as out-
puts from other sensory systems feed into
the orbitofrontal cortex to determine the
“reward value of the recognized object.”
This is a highly particular representation. In
economic terms, what is represented is nei-
ther pure information (i.e., that this is sushi)
nor pure utility (i.e., that it is something I
like) but rather a fusion of information and
utility. It is as if certain neurons in the
orbitofrontal cortex are saying “this is sushi
and I want it.”
The reward value of sushi depends in
turn on many factors. First, there is your
personal history with sushi. If you got sick
on sushi in the past, you will have an uncon-
scious and automatic aversion to it (“taste
aversion conditioning”). The amygdala
seems to play a critical role in this kind of
long-term learning (LeDoux 1996).
Second, the reward value of the sushi will
depend on your current level of hunger;
people can eat almost anything—grass,
bugs, human flesh—if they are hungry
enough. The orbitofrontal cortex and a sub-
cortical region called the hypothalamus are
sensitive to your level of hunger (Rolls
1999). Neurons in these regions fire more
rapidly at the sight or taste of food when
you are hungry, and fire less rapidly when
you are not hungry.
Quadrants I and II: Processing often
ends before quadrants I and II go to work.
If you are hungry, and like sushi, your
motor cortex will guide your arm to reach
for the sushi and eat it, drawing on auto-
matic quadrant III (reaching) and IV
(taste and enjoyment) processes. Under
some circumstances, however, higher level
processing may enter the picture. If you
saw a recent documentary on the risks of
eating raw fish, you may recoil; or if you
dislike sushi but anticipate disappointment
in the eyes of your proud host who made
the sushi herself, you’ll eat it anyway (or
pick it up and discreetly hide it in a napkin
8 Paul Romer (2000) uses the example of peanut tastes
as an illustration of how understanding the cause of
revealed preference matters. One person loves the taste of
peanuts, but is allergic to them and knows that the conse-
quences of eating would be disastrous. When she is hun-
gry, her visceral system motivates her to eat peanuts, but
her deliberative system, with its ability to consider delayed
consequences, inhibits her from eating them. The other
person developed a “taste aversion” to peanuts many years
ago, as a result of having gotten sick right after eating
them. She knows at a cognitive level that the peanuts were
not the cause of her sickness, but her visceral system over-
rules cognitive awareness. Revealed preference theory
would stop at the conclusion that both women have disu-
tility for peanuts. But the fact that the mechanisms under-
lying their preferences are different leads to predictable
differences in other kinds of behavior. For example, the
taste-averse woman will have a higher price elasticity
(she’ll eat peanuts if paid enough) and she will learn to
enjoy peanuts after eating them a few times (her taste-
aversion can be “extinguished”). The allergic woman will
also like the smell of peanuts, which the taste-averter
won’t. Treatments also differ: cognitive therapies for treat-
ing harmless phobias and taste-aversion train people to use
their conscious quadrant I processing to overrule visceral
quadrant IV impulses, whereas treatment of the allergic
peanut-avoider will concentrate on a medical cure.
when she turns to serve other guests).8
These explicit thoughts involve anticipated
feelings (your own and the host’s) and
draw on explicit memories from a part of
the brain called the hippocampus (see fig-
ure 1), inputs from the affective system
(sometimes referred to as the “limbic sys-
tem”), and anticipation (planning) from
the prefrontal cortex.
Because standard economics is best
described by the controlled, cognitive,
processes of quadrant 1, in the remainder of
this section we focus on the other half of
each dichotomy—automatic and affective
processes—providing further details of their
functioning.
3.2 Automatic Processes
Here, we review some key principles of
neural functioning that characterize auto-
matic processes. Our short-list includes:
parallelism, specialization, and coordina-
tion. Unpacking this a bit, we would say that:
(1) much of the brain’s processing involves
processes that unfold in parallel and are not
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accessible to consciousness; (2) the brain
utilizes multiple systems specialized to per-
form specific functions; and (3) it figures out
how to use existing specialized systems to
accomplish new tasks efficiently, whatever
functions they originally evolved to perform.
3.2.1 Parallelism
The brain performs a huge number of dif-
ferent computations in parallel. Because of the
massively interconnected “network” architec-
ture of neural systems, computations done in
one part of the brain have the potential to
influence any other computation, even when
there is no logical connection between the two.
Recent psychological research on automat-
ic processing provides many striking examples
of such spurious interactions. In one particu-
larly clever study, Gary Wells and Richard
Petty (1980) had subjects listen to an editori-
al delivered over headphones while shaking
their head either up–down, or right–left (sub-
jects were led to believe that shaking was a
legitimate part of the “product test”). Those
who were instructed to shake up–down
reported agreeing with the editorial more
than those instructed to shake left–right, pre-
sumably because in our culture up–down
head movement is associated with an attitude
of acceptance, and left–right with an attitude
of rejection. A similar impact on preference
was also observed in a study in which subjects
were asked to evaluate cartoons while holding
a pen either clamped horizontally between
their teeth or grasping it with pursed lips as if
puffing on a cigarette (Fritz Strack, Leonard
Martin, and Sabine Stepper 1988). The hori-
zontal clamp forces the mouth into a smile,
which enhances ratings, while “puffing”
forces the mouth into a pursed expression,
which lowers ratings. What the brain seems to
be doing, in these examples, is seeking a
“global equilibrium” that would reconcile the
forced action (e.g., forced smile) with the
response and the perceived attributes of the
evaluated object.
Given that people are capable of delibera-
tion, why doesn’t quadrant I thinking correct
the automatic activity produced by quadrant
III and IV processes when they are wrong?
Indeed sometimes it does: pilots learn to
trust their instrument panels, even when
they conflict with strong sensory intuitions
about where their plane is headed, but such
cognitive override is more the exception
than the rule. To override automatic
processes, quadrant I has to (a) recognize
that an initial impression is wrong (which
requires self-awareness about behavior in
the other quadrants), and then (b) deliber-
ately correct that impression. But when
sense making works outside of consciousness
it will not generate alarm bells to trigger the
recognition required in (a). This is surely the
case in the Epley and Gilovich studies. Even
when the external influence is obvious and
inappropriate, or the subject is warned
ahead of time, the deliberation required to
correct the first impression is hard work,
competing for mental resources and atten-
tion with all the other work that needs to be
done at the same moment (Daniel Gilbert
2002). The struggle between rapid uncon-
scious pattern-detection processes and their
slow, effortful modulation by deliberation is
not a fair contest; so automatic impressions
will influence behavior much of the time.
3.2.2 Specialization
Neurons in different parts of the brain have
different shapes and structures, different func-
tional properties, and operate in coordination
as systems that are functionally specialized.
Progress in neuroscience often involves trac-
ing well-known psychological functions to cir-
cumscribed brain areas. For example, Broca’s
and Wernicke’s areas are involved, respective-
ly, in the production and comprehension of
language. Patients with Wernicke damage can-
not understand spoken words. While they can
produce words themselves, they can’t monitor
their own speech, which results in sentences
of correctly articulated words strung together
into unintelligible gibberish. People with dam-
age to Broca’s area, in contrast, can understand
what is said to them and typically know what
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9 Retrograde amnesia is the more familiar kind, in
which people forget their past but can form new memo-
ries. The 2000 movie “Memento” drew an accurate por-
trait of anterograde amnesia and—interestingly for
economists— its vulnerability to exploitation by people
who know you are forgetting what they did to you.
they want to say, but have difficulty articulat-
ing it, sometimes to the point of not being able
to generate any words at all.
Beyond uncovering the nature of these
specialized systems, neuroscience has led to
the discovery of new functional systems,
some of which are quite surprising. For
example, surgeons conducting brain surgery
on an epileptic patient discovered a small
region of her brain which, when stimulated,
caused her to laugh (Itzhak Fried 1998),
hinting at the existence of a “humor system.”
Neuroscientists have also located an area in
the temporal lobe that, when stimulated
electrically, produces intense religious feel-
ings—e.g., the sense of a holy presence or
even explicit visions of God or Christ, even
in otherwise unreligious people (Michael
Persinger and Faye Healey 2002).
More generally, neuroscience has begun
to change our classification of functional
processes in the brain, in some cases identi-
fying distinct brain processes that serve the
same function, and in others drawing con-
nections between processes that have been
commonly viewed as distinct.
An example of the former is memory.
Studies of patients with localized brain dam-
age have confirmed the existence of distinct
memory systems, which can be selectively
“knocked out.” Anterograde amnesiacs, for
example, are commonly able to recall infor-
mation acquired before injury, and they are
able to acquire implicit information, includ-
ing perceptual-motor skills (like the ability to
read text in a mirror), but they are unable to
recall new explicit information for more than
a minute.9 Anterograde amnesiacs can also
acquire new emotional associations without
the explicit memories necessary to make
sense of them. In one famous example, a doc-
tor introduced himself with a tack concealed
in his hand that pricked a patient when they
shook hands. Later the doctor returned and,
although he did not remember the doctor, he
nevertheless responded negatively to the
doctor’s arrival and refused to shake his hand.
An example of the latter involves the expe-
rience of fear, and recognition of fear in oth-
ers. Experiencing an emotion and
recognizing the emotion when displayed
intuitively seems to involve entirely different
processes. However, recent findings suggest
that this is not the case. Numerous studies
have implicated the amygdala—a small
“organ” in the brain that is also intimately
linked to the sense of smell—to fear pro-
cessing. Lesions to the amygdala of rats and
other animals disrupt or even eliminate the
animals’ fear-responses. Humans with stroke
damage in the amygdala show similar
deficits in reacting to threatening stimuli.
The same damage that disrupts fear
responses in humans also cripples a person’s
ability to recognize facial expressions of fear
in others, and to represent such expressions
in pictures. Figure 2 shows how a patient
with amygdala damage expressed different
emotions when asked to draw them in the
form of facial expressions. The patient was
able to render most emotions with remark-
able artistic talent. But when it came to
drawing an expression of fear she felt clue-
less. She didn’t even try to draw an adult
face; instead she drew a picture of a crawling
infant looking apprehensive.
The finding that people who don’t experi-
ence fear also can’t recognize it or represent it
pictorially, suggests that two phenomena that
had been viewed as distinct—experiencing
and representing fear—in fact have important
commonalities. Beyond this, they point to the
intriguing notion that to recognize an emotion
in others, one needs to be able to experience
it oneself (see Alvin Goldman 2003).
The idea that people have specialized sys-
tems that are invoked in specific situations
could have dramatic consequences for eco-
nomics. The standard model of economic
behavior assumes that people have a unitary
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Figure 2. Representations of different emotions drawn by a patient with amygdala damage 
(Adolphs et al. 1995).
set of preferences which they seek to satisfy,
and economists often criticize psychology for
lacking such a unified perspective. The exis-
tence of such selectively—invoked, special-
ized, systems, however, raises the question
of whether a unified account of behavior 
is likely to do a very good job of capturing
the complexities of human behavior. As
Jonathan Cohen (personal communication)
aptly expressed it at a recent conference on
neuroeconomics, “Economics has one theo-
ry, psychologists many—perhaps because
brains have different systems that they use to
solve different problems.”
3.2.3 Coordination
In a process that is not well understood,
the brain figures out how to do the tasks it is
assigned efficiently, using the specialized sys-
tems it has at its disposal. When the brain is
confronted with a new problem it initially
draws heavily on diverse regions, including,
often, the prefrontal cortex (where controlled
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Figure 3. Regions of brain activation when first playing Tetris (left) and after several weeks of 
practice (right) (Haier et al. 1992).
processes are concentrated). But over time,
activity becomes more streamlined, concen-
trating in regions that specialized in process-
ing relevant to the task. In one study
(Richard Haier et al. 1992), subjects’ brains
were imaged at different points in time as
they gained experience with the computer
game Tetris, which requires rapid hand–eye
coordination and spatial reasoning. When
subjects began playing, they were highly
aroused and many parts of the brain were
active (Figure 3, left panel). However, as they
got better at the game, overall blood flow to
the brain decreased markedly, and activity
became localized in only a few brain regions
(Figure 3, right panel).
Much as an economy ideally adjusts to the
introduction of a new product by gradually
shifting production to the firms that can pro-
duce the best goods most cheaply, with expe-
rience at a task or problem, the brain seems
to gradually shift processing toward brain
regions and specialized systems that can
solve problems automatically and efficiently
with low effort.
Andrew Lo and Dmitry Repin (2002)
observe a similar result in a remarkable
study of professional foreign-exchange and
derivatives traders who were wired for psy-
chophysiological measurements while they
traded. Less-experienced traders showed
significant physiological reactions to about
half of the market events (e.g., trend rever-
sals). More experienced traders reacted
much less to the same events. Years of
automatizing apparently enabled seasonal
traders to react calmly to dramatic events
that send a novice trader on an emotional
roller coaster.
Given the severe limitations of controlled
processes, the brain is constantly in the
process of automating the processing of
tasks—i.e., executing them using automatic
rather than controlled processes. Indeed,
one of the hallmarks of expertise in an area is
the use of automatic processes such as visual
imagery and categorization. In one now-
famous study, Fernand Gobet and Simon
(1996) tested memory for configurations of
chess pieces positioned on a chessboard.
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They found that expert chess players were
able to store the positions of players almost
instantly—but only if they were in positions
corresponding to a plausible game. For ran-
domly arranged chess pieces, the experts
were not much better than novices. Further
investigations have found that chess grand-
masters store roughly 10,000 different possi-
ble board setups in memory which they can
recognize almost instantly and respond to.
More recent research in decision making
suggests that this is a more general phenom-
enon, because decision making often takes
the form of pattern matching rather than of
an explicit weighing of costs and benefits
(e.g., Robyn Leboeuf 2002; Doug Medin
and Max Bazerman 1999).
In some cases, repeated use of particular
specialized systems can produce physically
recognizable changes. Studies have found
that, for example, violinists who finger violin
strings with their left hand show enlarged
development of cortical regions which corre-
spond to fingers on the left hand (Thomas
Elbert et al. 1995), and the brain regions
responsible for navigation and spatial mem-
ory (the hippocampus) of London taxi driv-
ers are larger than comparable areas in
non-taxi drivers (Eleanor Maguire et al.
2000). While the exact causality is difficult to
determine (perhaps preexisting differences
in size of brain region affect people’s talents
and occupational choices), a causal connec-
tion in the posited direction has been
demonstrated in songbirds, whose brains
show observable differences as a function of
whether or not they have been exposed to
the song that is characteristic of their species
(Carol Whaling et al. 1997).
3.2.4 The Winner Take All Nature of
Neural Processing
Another feature that is reminiscent of the
operation of an economy is the “winner-take-
all” nature of neural information processing
(M. James Nichols and Bill Newsome 2002).
While there is a lot that we do not know
about the way in which the huge amount of
10 Alternatively, one could imagine that perceptions or
beliefs aggregate all relevant neural information (which
would also be more in tune with Bayesian updating). So far
as we can tell, the brain can use both principles of aggre-
gation: when different neural populations carry “similar”
information, then the overall perceptual judgment is an
average of all information; when they carry very different
information, then the overall judgment follows the “win-
ner-take-all” rule (Nichols and Newsome 2002). For a sim-
ple model of a neural network that exhibits these
properties, see Richard Hahnloser et al. 2000.
neural activity is distilled into a categorical
percept, or a decision, we do know that the
brain doesn’t invariably integrate (i.e., aver-
age) over the signals carried by individual
neurons. In particular, when two distinct
groups of neurons convey different informa-
tion about the external world, the resulting
perceptual judgment often adopts the infor-
mation of one neuronal group and entirely
suppresses the information carried by the
other. This is referred to as a “winner-take-
all” principle of neural signal-extraction. As a
result, many brain processes are fundamen-
tally categorical, yielding well-defined per-
ceptions and thoughts even if the incoming
information is highly ambiguous.10 The
advantages of this principle are clear if the
ultimate job of the brain is to initiate a dis-
crete action, or categorize an object as one of
several discrete types. The disadvantage is
that updating of beliefs in response to new
information can procede in fits and starts,
with beliefs remaining static as long as the
new information does not lead to recatego-
rization, but changing abruptly and dramati-
cally when the accumulation of evidence
results in a change of categorization (see
Sendhil Mullainathan 2002).
3.3 Affective Processes
The way the brain evolved is critical to
understanding human behavior. In many
domains, such as eating, drinking, sex, and
even drug use, human behavior resembles
that of our close mammalian relatives, which
is not surprising because we share many of
the neural mechanisms that are largely
responsible for these behaviors. Many of the
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processes that occur in these systems are
affective rather than cognitive; they are
directly concerned with motivation. This
might not matter for economics were it not
for the fact that the principles that guide the
affective system—the way that it operates—
is so much at variance with the standard 
economic account of behavior.
3.3.1 Primacy of Affect
In contrast to the intuitive view of human
behavior as driven by deliberations about
costs and benefits, it does not do a terrible
injustice to the field of psychology to say that
a growing consensus has developed around
the view that affect is primary in the sense
that it is “first on the scene” and plays a dom-
inant role in behavior. Indeed, as we discuss
below (section 3.4.2), the conscious brain
often erroneously interprets behavior that
emerges from automatic, affective, processes
as the outcome of cognitive deliberations.
In a series of seminal papers, Zajonc (1980,
1984, 1998) presented the results of studies
which showed, first, that people can often
identify their affective reaction to some-
thing—whether they like it or not—more
rapidly than they can even say what it is, and,
second, that affective reactions to things can
be dissociated from memory for details of
those things, with the former often being bet-
ter. For example, we often remember
whether we liked or disliked a particular per-
son, book or movie, without being able to
remember any other details (Bargh 1984).
Subsequent research in social psychology
takes Zajonc’s initial research a step further
by showing that the human brain affectively
tags virtually all objects and concepts, and
that these affective tags are brought to mind
effortlessly and automatically when those
objects and concepts are evoked (e.g., Russell
Fazio et al. 1986; Anthony Greenwald, Mark
Klinger, and Thomas Liu 1989; Greenwald
1992; Bargh, Shelly Chaiken, Paula
Raymond, and Charles Hymes 1996; Jan De
Houwer, Dirk Hermans, and Paul Eelen
1998; David Houston and Fazio 1989)
11 The amygdala has excellent properties for perform-
ing such a function. Recent research in which amygdalae
of subjects were scanned while threatening stimuli were
flashed at various positions in the visual field found that
amygdala activation is just as rapid and just as pronounced
when such stimuli are presented outside as when they are
presented inside the region of conscious awareness (Adam
Anderson et al. 2003).
LeDoux and his colleagues (summarized in
LeDoux 1996) have arrived at similar conclu-
sions about the primacy of affect using very
different research methods and subjects.
Based on studies conducted on rats, they dis-
covered that there are direct neural projec-
tions from the sensory thalamus (which
performs crude signal-processing) to the
amygdala (which is widely believed to play a
critical role in the processing of affective
stimuli) that are not channeled through the
neocortex. As a result, animals can have an
affective reaction to stimuli before their cor-
tex has had the chance to perform more
refined processing of the stimuli—they are lit-
erally afraid before knowing whether they
should be. Such immediate affective respons-
es provide organisms with a fast but crude
assessment of the behavioral options they face
which makes it possible to take rapid action.
They also provide a mechanism for interrupt-
ing and refocusing attention (Simon 1967),
typically shifting processing from automatic to
controlled processing. As Jorge Armony et al.
(1995) note, “A threatening signal, such as
one indicating the presence of a predator,
arising from outside of the focus of attention
will have a reduced representation in the cor-
tex. Thus, if the amygdala relied solely on the
cortical pathway to receive sensory informa-
tion, it would not be capable of processing,
and responding to, those danger signals that
are not within the focus of attention” (see also,
Armony et al. 1997; Gavin DeBecker 1997).11
A similar pattern to the one LeDoux
observed in rats can also be seen in humans.
Gilbert and Michael Gill (2000) propose that
people are “momentary realists” who trust
their immediate emotional reactions and
only correct them through a comparatively
laborious cognitive process. If the car behind
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12 The mechanisms that monitor the body’s state can
be exquisitely complex, and can include both internal and
external cues. In the case of nutritional regulation, for
example, internal cues include gastric distension (James
Gibbs et al. 1981), receptors sensitive to the chemical
composition of the food draining from the stomach D.
Greenberg, Smith and Gibbs (1990); Arthur L.
Campfield and Smith 1990). External cues include time
of day, estimated time till the next feeding, and the sight
or smell of food.
you honks after your light turns green, you
are likely to respond with immediate anger,
followed, perhaps, by a sheepish acknowl-
edgment that maybe the honking person
behind you had a point, as you were dis-
tracted when the light turned green.
It is important to note that while emotions
may be fleeting, they can have a large eco-
nomic impact if they create irreversible rash
decisions (as in “crimes of passion”). Even
emotions which could be transitory, such as
embarrassment, can have long-run effects if
they are kept alive by memory and social
reminders. For example, Dora Costa and
Matthew Kahn (2004) found that deserters
in the Union Army during the Civil War, who
were allowed to return to their hometowns
without explicit penalty, often moved away
because of the shame and social ostracism of
being known to their neighbors as a deserter.
3.3.2 Homeostasis
To understand how the affective system
operates, one needs to recall that humans did
not evolve to be happy, but to survive and
reproduce. An important process by which
the body attempts to achieve these goals is
called homeostasis. Homeostasis involves
detectors that monitor when a system departs
from a “set-point,”12 and mechanisms that
restore equilibrium when such departures
are detected. Some—indeed most—of these
mechanisms do not involve deliberate action.
Thus, when the core body temperature falls
below the 98.6° F set-point, blood tends to
be withdrawn from extremities, and when it
rises above the set-point one begins to sweat.
But other processes do involve deliberate
action—e.g., putting on one’s jacket when
cold or turning on the air conditioner when
hot. The brain motivates one to take such
actions using both a “carrot” and a “stick.”
The stick reflects the fact that departing
from a set-point usually feels bad—e.g., it
feels bad to be either excessively hot or
cold—and this negative feeling motivates
one to take actions that move one back
toward the set-point. The carrot is a process
called “alliesthesia” (Michael Cabanac
1979) whereby actions that move one
toward the set-point tend to feel pleasura-
ble. When the body temperature falls below
98.6°, for example, almost anything that
raises body temperature (such as placing
one’s hand in warm water) feels good, and
conversely when the body temperature is
elevated almost anything that lowers body
temperature feels good.
As economists, we are used to thinking of
preferences as the starting point for human
behavior and behavior as the ending point. A
neuroscience perspective, in contrast, views
explicit behavior as only one of many mech-
anisms that the brain uses to maintain home-
ostasis, and preferences as transient state
variables that ensure survival and reproduc-
tion. The traditional economic account of
behavior, which assumes that humans act so
as to maximally satisfy their preferences,
starts in the middle (or perhaps even toward
the end) of the neuroscience account.
Rather than viewing pleasure as the goal of
human behavior, a more realistic account
would view pleasure as a homeostatic cue—
an informational signal.13,14
13 Even deliberative behavior generated by quadrant I
is typically organized in a fashion that resembles home-
ostasis (Miller, Eugene Gallanter, and Karl Pribram 1960;
Loewenstein 1999). Rather than simply maximizing pref-
erences in a limitless fashion, people set goals for them-
selves, monitor their progress toward those goals, and
adjust behavior when they fall short of their goals.
14 Of course, even the neuroscience account begins, in
some sense, in the middle. A more complete understand-
ing of behavior would also ask how these different mecha-
nisms evolved over time. Since evolution selects for genes
that survive and reproduce, the result of evolution is
unlikely to maximize pleasure or minimize pain. (See Gary
Becker and Luis Rayo 2004.)
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An important feature of many homeosta-
tic systems is that they are highly attuned to
changes in stimuli rather than their levels. A
dramatic demonstration of such sensitivity
to change came from single-neuron studies
of monkeys responding to juice rewards
(see Wolfram Schultz and Anthony
Dickinson 2000). These studies measured
the firing of dopamine neurons in the ani-
mal’s ventral striatum, which is known to
play a powerful role in motivation and
action. In their paradigm, a tone was sound-
ed, and two seconds later a juice reward was
squirted into the monkey’s mouth. Initially,
the neurons did not fire until the juice was
delivered. Once the animal learned that the
tone forecasted the arrival of juice two sec-
onds later, however, the same neurons fired
at the sound of the tone, but did not fire
when the juice reward arrived. These neu-
rons were not responding to reward, or its
absence . . . they were responding to devia-
tions from expectations. (They are some-
times called “prediction neurons.”) When
the juice was expected from the tone, but
was not delivered, the neurons fired at a
very low rate, as if expressing disappoint-
ment. The same pattern can be observed at
a behavioral level in animals, who will work
harder (temporarily) when a reinforcement
is suddenly increased and go “on strike”
when reinforcement falls.15 Neural sensitiv-
ity to change is probably important in
explaining why the evaluation of risky gam-
bles depends on a reference point which
15 As Rolls (1999) writes, “We are sensitive to some
extent not just to the absolute level of reinforcement being
received, but also to the change in the rate or magnitude
of reinforcers being received. This is well shown by the
phenomena of positive and negative contrast effects with
rewards. Positive contrast occurs when the magnitude of a
reward is increased. An animal will work very much hard-
er for a period (perhaps lasting for minutes or longer) in
this situation, before gradually reverting to a rate close to
that at which the animal was working for the small rein-
forcement. A comparable contrast effect is seen when the
reward magnitude (or rate at which rewards are obtained)
is reduced—there is a negative overshoot in the rate of
working for a time.”
encodes whether an outcome is a gain or a
loss (see section 5), why self-reported hap-
piness (and behavioral indicators like sui-
cide) depend on changes in income and
wealth, rather than levels (Andrew Oswald
1997), and why violations of expectations
trigger powerful emotional responses
(George Mandler 1982).
3.4 Interactions between the Systems
Behavior emerges from a continuous
interplay between neural systems support-
ing activity within each of the four quad-
rants. Three aspects of this interaction bear
special emphasis, which we labeled “collab-
oration,” “competition,” and “sense-mak-
ing.” Collaboration captures the insight that
decision making, which is to say “rationality”
in the broad, nontechnical sense of the
word, is not a matter of shifting decision-
making authority from quadrants II, III, and
IV toward the deliberative, nonaffective
quadrant I, but more a matter of maintain-
ing proper collaboration in activity across all
four quadrants. If quadrant I tries to do the
job alone, it will often fail.16 Competition
reflects the fact that different processes—
most notably affective and cognitive—often
drive behavior in conflicting directions and
compete for control of behavior. Sense-
making refers to how we make sense of such
collaboration and competition—how we
make sense of our behavior. While behavior
is, in fact, determined by the interaction of
all four quadrants, conscious reflection on
our behavior, and articulating reasons for it,
is basically quadrant I trying to make sense
of that interaction. And, not surprisingly,
16 Roy Baumeister, Todd Heatherton, and Dianne Tice
(1994) review studies which suggest that excessively high
incentives can result in supra-optimal levels of motivation
that have perverse effects on performance (known as the
Yerkes–Dodson law). Beyond documenting such “choking
under pressure,” the review research showing that it often
occurs because it causes people to utilize controlled
processes for performing functions, such as swinging a golf
club, that are best accomplished with automatic processes.
See Dan Ariely et al. (2004) for the latest evidence.
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quadrant I has a tendency to explain behav-
ior in terms it can understand – in terms of
quadrant I processes.
3.4.1 Collaboration and Competition
Although it is heuristically useful to distin-
guish between cognitive and affective
processes, and between controlled and auto-
matic processes, most judgments and behav-
iors result from interactions between them.
Collaboration, delegation of activity, and
proper balance across the quadrants are
essential to normal decision making. Many
decision-making disorders may originate in
an improper division of labor between the
quadrants. For example, psychiatry recog-
nizes a decision-making continuum defined
by the impulsive, “light” decision-making
style at one end and the compulsive, “heavy”
style at the other. The decisions of an impul-
sive individual are excessively influenced by
external stimuli, pressures, and demands.
Such a person may not be able to give a more
satisfying explanation of an action except
that “he felt like it” (David Shapiro 1965). By
contrast, an obsessive–compulsive person
will subject even the most trivial decisions to
extensive deliberation and calculation. In sit-
uations in which it is entirely appropriate to
make a quick decision based “on impulse”—
e.g., when choosing which video to rent 
for the evening or what to order in a 
restaurant—the obsessive-compulsive will
get stuck.
We are only now beginning to appreciate
the importance of affect for normal decision
making. The affective system provides inputs
in the form of affective evaluations of behav-
ioral options—what Damasio (1994) refers
to as “somatic markers.” Damasio and his
colleagues show that individuals with mini-
mal cognitive, but major affective deficits
have difficulty making decisions, and often
make poor decisions when they do (Antoine
Bechara et al. 1994; Bechara, Damasio,
Damasio, and Lee 1999; Damasio 1994). It is
not enough to “know” what should be done;
it is also necessary to “feel” it.
There is also interesting experimental evi-
dence that deliberative thinking blocks
access to one’s emotional reactions to objects
and so reduces the quality of decisions (e.g.,
Wilson and Schooler 1991). In one study
(Wilson et al. 1993) college students select-
ed their favorite poster from a set of posters.
Those who were instructed to think of rea-
sons why they liked or disliked the posters
before making their selection ended up less
happy on average with their choice of
posters (and less likely to keep them up on
their dorm room wall) than subjects who
were not asked to provide reasons.
Needless to say, affect can also distort cog-
nitive judgments. For example, emotions
have powerful effects on memory—e.g.,
when people become sad, they tend to recall
sad memories (which often increases their
sadness). Emotions also affect perceptions of
risks—anger makes people less threatened
by risks, and sadness makes them more
threatened (Jennifer Lerner and Dacher
Keltner 2001). Emotions also create “moti-
vated cognition”—people are good at per-
suading themselves that what they would
like to happen is what will happen. Quack
remedies for desperate sick people, and get-
rich-quick scams are undoubtedly aided by
the human propensity for wishful thinking.
Wishful thinking may also explain high rates
of new business failure (Camerer and Dan
Lovallo 1999), trading in financial markets,
undersaving, and low rates of investment in
education (foregoing large economic
returns). As LeDoux (1996) writes, “While
conscious control over emotions is weak,
emotions can flood consciousness. This is 
so because the wiring of the brain at this
point in our evolutionary history is such that
connections from the emotional systems to
the cognitive systems are stronger than con-
nections from the cognitive systems to the
emotional systems.”
When it comes to spending money or
delaying gratification, taking or avoiding
risks, and behaving kindly or nastily toward
other people, people often find themselves
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of “two minds”; our affective systems drive us
in one direction and cognitive deliberations
in another. We find ourselves almost compul-
sively eating our children’s left-over
Halloween candy, while obsessing about how
to lose the extra ten pounds; gambling reck-
lessly at the casino, even as a small voice in
our head tell us to rein it in; trying to build up
courage to step up to the podium; or tempt-
ed to give a little to the pathetic street-corner
beggar though we know our crumpled dollar
will go further if donated to United Way.
All of these deviations occur because our
affective system responds to different cues,
and differently to the same cues, as our
cognitive system does. As Rolls (1999)
writes,
emotions often seem very intense in humans,
indeed sometimes so intense that they produce
behaviour which does not seem to be adaptive,
such as fainting instead of producing an active
escape response, or freezing instead of avoiding,
or vacillating endlessly about emotional situa-
tions and decisions, or falling hopelessly in love
even when it can be predicted to be without
hope or to bring ruin. The puzzle is not only that
the emotion is so intense, but also that even with
our rational, reasoning, capacities, humans still
find themselves in these situations, and may find
it difficult to produce reasonable and effective
behaviour for resolving the situation (p. 282).
Such divergences between emotional reac-
tions and cognitive evaluations arise, Rolls
(1999) argues, because
in humans the reward and punishment systems
may operate implicitly in comparable ways to
those in other animals. But in addition to this,
humans have the explicit system (closely related
to consciousness) which enables us consciously
to look and predict many steps ahead. (p. 282).
Thus, for example, the sight or smell of a
cookie might initiate motivation to consume
on the part of the affective system, but might
also remind the cognitive system that one is
on a diet.
Exactly how cognitive and affective sys-
tems interact in the control of behavior is not
well understood. At a neurological level, it
appears that an organ in the reptilian brain
called the striatum (part of a larger system
called the basal ganglia) plays a critical role.
The striatum receives inputs from all parts of
the cerebral cortex, including the motor cor-
tex, as well as from affective systems such as
the amygdala. Lesions of pathways that sup-
ply dopamine to the striatum leads, in ani-
mals, to a failure to orient to stimuli, a failure
to initiate movements, and a failure to eat or
drink (J. F. Marshall et al. 1974). In humans,
depletion of dopamine in the striatum is
found in Parkinson’s disease, the most dra-
matic symptom of which is a lack of volun-
tary movement. The striatum seems to be
involved in the selection of behaviors from
competition between different cognitive and
affective systems—in producing one coher-
ent stream of behavioral output, which can
be interrupted if a signal of higher priority is
received, or a surprising stimulus appears
(Carolyn Zink et al. 2003).
The extent of collaboration and competi-
tion between cognitive and affective sys-
tems, and the outcome of conflict when it
occurs, depends critically on the intensity of
affect (Loewenstein 1996; Loewenstein and
Lerner 2003). At low levels of intensity,
affect appears to play a largely “advisory”
role. A number of theories posit that emo-
tions carry information that people use as an
input into the decisions they face (e.g.,
Damasio 1994; Ellen Peters and Paul Slovic
2000). The best-developed of these
approaches is affect-as-information theory
(Norbert Schwarz and Gerald Clore 1983;
Schwarz 1990; Clore 1992).
At intermediate levels of intensity, peo-
ple begin to become conscious of conflicts
between cognitive and affective inputs. It
is at such intermediate levels of intensity
that one observes the types of efforts at
self-control that have received so much
attention in the literature (Jon Elster 1977;
Walter Mischel, Ebbe Ebbesen, and
Antonette Zeiss 1972; Thomas Schelling
1978, 1984).
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Finally, at even greater levels of intensity,
affect can be so powerful as to virtually pre-
clude decision making. No one “decides” to
fall asleep at the wheel, but many people do.
Under the influence of intense affective
motivation, people often report themselves as
being “out of control” or “acting against their
own self-interest” (Baumeister, Heatherton,
and Tice 1994; Stephen Hoch and
Loewenstein 1991; Loewenstein 1996). As
Rita Carter writes, “where thought conflicts
with emotion, the latter is designed by the
neural circuitry in our brains to win” (1999).
3.4.2 Spurious Sense-Making
Sense-making is an important form of
interaction between quadrant I and the
other quadrants. The brain’s powerful drive
toward sense making leads us to strive to
interpret our own behavior. Since quadrant I
often does not have conscious access to
activity in the other quadrants, it is perhaps
not surprising that it tends to over-attribute
behavior to itself—i.e., to deliberative deci-
sion processes. Even though much of the
brain’s activity is “cognitively inaccessible,”
we have the illusion that we are able to make
sense of it, and we tend to make sense of it
in terms of quadrant I processes.
Research with EEG recordings has shown
(Benjamin Libet 1985) that the precise
moment at which we become aware of an
intention to perform an action trails the ini-
tial wave of brain activity associated with that
action (the EEG “readiness potential”) by
about 300 msec. The overt behavioral
response itself then follows the sensation of
intention by another 200 msec. Hence, what
is registered in consciousness is a regular
pairing of the sensation of intention followed
by the overt behavior. Because the neural
activity antecedent to the intention is inac-
cessible to consciousness, we experience
“free will” (i.e., we cannot identify anything
that is causing the feeling of intention).
Because the behavior reliably follows the
intention, we feel that this “freely willed”
intention is causing the action—but in fact,
17 “… the brain contains a specific cognitive system that
binds intentional actions to their effects to construct a
coherent experience of our own agency” (Patrick Haggard,
Sam Clark, and Jeri Kalogeras 2002).
both the sensation of intention and the overt
action are caused by prior neural events
which are inaccessible to consciousness (see
Daniel Wegner and Thalia Wheatley 1999).17
Quadrant I tends to explain behavior ego-
centrically—to attribute it to the types of
deliberative processes that it is responsible
for (see Richard Nisbett and Wilson 1977). A
dramatic study demonstrating this phenom-
enon was conducted with a “split-brain”
patient (who had an operation separating the
connection between the two hemispheres of
his brain). The patient’s right hemisphere
could interpret language but not speak, and
the left hemisphere could speak (LeDoux
1996). The patient’s right hemisphere was
instructed to wave his hand (by showing the
word “wave” on the left part of a visual
screen, which only the right hemisphere
processed). The left hemisphere saw the
right hand waving but was unaware of the
instructions that had been given to the right
hemisphere (because the cross-hemisphere
connections were severed). When the
patient was asked why he waved, the left
hemisphere (acting as spokesperson for the
entire body) invariably came up with a plau-
sible explanation, like “I saw somebody I
knew and waved at them.”
4. General Implications of 
Neuroscience for Economics
To add value to economics, neuroscience
needs to suggest new insights and useful
perspectives on old problems. This section
discusses some broad implications for eco-
nomics of the ideas and findings reviewed in
the previous section. First, we show that
neuroscience findings raise questions about
the usefulness of some of the most common
constructs that economists commonly use,
such as risk aversion, time preference, and
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altruism. Second, we show how the exis-
tence of specialized systems challenges
standard assumptions about human infor-
mation processing and suggests that intelli-
gence and its opposite—bounded
rationality—are likely to be highly domain-
specific. Third, brain-scans conducted while
people win or lose money suggest that
money activates similar reward areas as do
other “primary reinforcers” like food and
drugs, which implies that money confers
direct utility, rather than simply being val-
ued only for what it can buy. Fourth, we
show that research on the motivational and
pleasure systems of the brain human chal-
lenges the assumed connection between
motivation and pleasure. Finally, we
describe some of the important implications
of cognitive inaccessibility for economics.
4.1 Economic Constructs
Knowing how the brain solves problems,
and what specialized systems it has at its dis-
posal to do so, challenges some of our fun-
damental assumptions about how people
differ from one-another when it comes to
economic behavior. Economists currently
classify individuals on such dimensions as
“time preference,” “risk preference,” and
“altruism.” These are seen as characteristics
that are stable within an individual over time
and consistent across activities; someone
who is risk-seeking in one domain is expect-
ed to be risk-seeking in other domains as
well. But empirical evidence shows that risk-
taking, time discounting, and altruism are
very weakly correlated or uncorrelated
across situations. This inconsistency results
in part from the fact that preferences are
state-contingent (and that people may not
recognize the state-contingency, which—if
they did—would trigger overrides that
impose more consistency than observed).
But it also may point to fundamental prob-
lems with the constructs that we use to
define how people differ from each other.
As an illustration, take the concept of
time-preference. In empirical applications,
economic analyses typically assume that the
same degree of time preference is present
for all intertemporal tradeoffs— saving for
the future, flossing your teeth, dieting, and
getting a tattoo. For example, whether a per-
son smokes is sometimes taken as a crude
proxy for low rates of time discounting, in
studies of educational investment or savings.
Thinking about the modularity of the brain
suggests that while different intertemporal
tradeoffs may have some element of plan-
ning in common (e.g., activity in prefrontal
cortex), different types of intertemporal
choices are likely to invoke qualitatively dif-
ferent mixtures of neural systems and hence
to produce entirely different patterns of
behavior. Then measured discount rates will
not be perfectly correlated across domains,
and might hardly be correlated at all.
Much as the study of memory has been
refined by the identification of distinct mem-
ory systems, each with its own properties of
learning, forgetting, and retrieval; the study of
intertemporal choice might be enhanced by a
similar decomposition, most likely informed
by neuroscience research. For example,
unpublished research by Loewenstein and
Roberto Weber suggests that, in normal sam-
ples, future-oriented behaviors tend to clus-
ter in tasks which tap different dimensions of
self-control. For example, flossing your teeth
is statistically associated with a number of
other minor, repetitive, helpful behaviors
such as feeding parking meters religiously
and being on time for appointments. These
behaviors seem to involve “conscientious-
ness,” an important measure in personality
theory.18 John Ameriks, Andrew Caplin, and
John Leahy (in press) measured the propen-
sity to plan by asking TIAA–CREF enrollees
to disagree or agree with statements like “I
have spent a great deal of time developing a
financial plan.” These measures correlate
with actual savings rates.
Dieting and use of addictive drugs, in
contrast to punctuality and flossing, might
be involve very different circuitry and
hence reveal fundamentally different dis-
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18 Based on the observation that drugs affecting sero-
tonin receptors are used to treat compulsion disorders,
compulsivity appears to have some connection to the neu-
rotransmitter serotonin, In addition, compulsion disorders
are thought to be related to hyperactivity in the caudate
nucleus, a “reminder” region of the limbic system.
counting behavior. Both of these activities
involve visceral motives that seem to differ
reliably across persons and may be only
weakly linked to conscientiousness. If
you’re the kind of person who loves to eat,
or drink alcohol, then resisting indulging in
those activities requires difficult exertion of
self-control.
4.2 Domain-Specific Expertise
Economics implicitly assumes that people
have general cognitive capabilities that can
be applied to any type of problem and,
hence, that people will perform equivalently
on problems that have similar structure. The
existence of systems that evolved to perform
specific functions, in contrast, suggests that
performance will depend critically on
whether a problem that one confronts can
be, and is in fact, processed by a specialized
system that is well adapted to that form of
processing. When a specialized system exists
and is applied to a particular task, processing
is rapid and the task feels relatively effort-
less. Automatic processes involved in vision,
for example, are lightning fast and occur
with no feeling of mental effort, so people
are not aware of the power and sophistica-
tion of the processes that allow it to happen.
Even the most powerful computers don’t
hold a candle to humans when it comes to
visual perception or voice recognition.
When we lack such tailored systems, how-
ever, we are likely to seem extraordinarily
flat-footed because we will be forced to
“muscle it out” with quadrant 1 processing,
much as autistic individuals seem to solve
theory of mind problems by building up a
statistical understanding of appropriate
social behavior. As a general rule, we should
expect people to be geniuses when present-
ed with problems that can be, and are
processed by specialized systems, but rela-
tively obtuse when they are forced to rely on
controlled processes.
A neat illustration of this is provided by the
“Wason four-card problem” in logic. Subjects
are shown four cards, each with a letter on
one side and a number on the other. The
exposed card faces read “X,” “Y,” “1,” and “2.”
Subjects are asked which cards would need to
be turned over to test the rule: “If there is an
X on one side there is a 2 on the other.” Few
subjects give the right answers, which are X
and 1 (if there’s an X on the opposite side of
the “1” the rule is broken). However, most
subjects give the right answer when the logi-
cally equivalent problem is put in a cheating-
detection frame. For example, if there are
four children from two different towns and
two school districts and the rule is “If a child
lives in Concord he or she must go to
Concord High,” most subjects realize that the
home address of the student who does not go
to Concord High must be checked to see if
she is cheating and not going to Concord
High when she should (Cosmides 1989).
Of particular interest to economics, many
neuroscientists believe there is a specialized
“mentalizing” (or “theory of mind”) module,
which controls a person’s inferences about
what other people believe, feel, or might
do. The hint at the existence of such a ded-
icated module came from tests conducted
by developmental psychologists in which
two children are shown an object in the
process of being concealed (see Uta Frith
2001a). One child then leaves, and the
other child observes as the object is moved
to a new location. The child who remains in
the room is then asked to predict where the
child who left will look for the object when
she returns. Normal children are typically
able to solve this problem around age three
or four. Autistic children as a rule master
this distinction much later (8–12 years), and
with great difficulty, although some (espe-
cially those with “Asperger syndrome”)
have normal or superior intelligence. At the
same time, the autistic child will have no
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difficulty with general inferences having a
similar logical form (e.g., if a photo is taken
of the object’s location, and the object is
then moved, they will correctly infer that
the photo will register the object in the old
place, before it was moved).
Autistic adult individuals may compensate
in many ways and eventually pass such basic
tests of mentalizing. However, they have dif-
ficulty appreciating more subtle social
meanings (e.g., irony), and will sometimes
wonder at the “uncanny ability” of
non–autistic persons to “read minds” (Frith
2001b). People with Asperger’s syndrome,
who are intelligent but have trouble under-
standing emotions in others, show lower
activation in the medial prefrontal regions as
compared with normals when presented
with problems that involve mentalizing, but
also show greater activation in more ventral
(lower) region of the prefrontal cortex,
which is normally responsible for general
reasoning (Francesca Happe et al. 1996). A
natural interpretation is that Asperger indi-
viduals eventually deduce the answer
through a complex process of reasoning
instead of grasping it directly by a special-
ized module, as if they create a neural
“workaround” or “long-cut.” In the medical
literature, one can also find patients with
brain lesions who exhibit difficulties with
mentalizing tasks but not with other types of
cognition (Andrea Rowe et al. 2001; James
Blair and Lisa Cipolotti 2000). This, too, is
consistent with the hypothesis of a separable
mentalizing module.
The possibility of a mentalizing module
has gained credibility and substance through
converging neuroscientific evidence. fMRI
studies have shown that when normal adults
are given pairs of closely matching judgment
problems, differing only in whether they do
or do not require mentalizing, the mentaliz-
ing problems lead to greater activation in the
left medial prefrontal cortex (Fletcher et al.
1995; Rebecca Saxe and Nancy Kanwisher
2003). As ultimate proof, one would like to
identify neuronal populations that are
specifically turned on by mentalizing activi-
ty. Neuroscience is not there yet, but recent
single-cell recordings in monkeys have iden-
tified an intriguing class of “mirror neurons”
in the prefrontal cortex, which fire either
when an experimenter performs a physical
action (e.g., grasping a peanut) or when the
monkey performs (“mirrors”) the same
action. Having such neurons makes learning
by imitation easy and supports mind reading
by, for example, internally simulating the
facial expressions of others.
Mentalizing is relevant for economics
because many judgments require agents to
make guesses about how other people feel or
what they will do. The concept of equilibri-
um requires that agents correctly anticipate
what others will do; presumably this arises
because of accurate mentalizing, or through
some kind of specific learning about behav-
ior which may not transfer well to new
domains or when variables change.
Furthermore, the kind of learning about
players’ “types” from observation in
Bayesian–Nash equilibrium is modeled as
simply Bayesian updating of the likelihoods
of chance events in the face of new informa-
tion. Since mentalizing is a special ability,
and logical-deductive reasoning can only
partially compensate for its absence, treating
inference about behavior of other agents and
“nature” is a simplification which may be
wrong.19
19 Our point here is simple: Circuitry that controls
updating of frequencies of events in the world—whether it
snows in Chicago in January—may be dissociated from cir-
cuitry that controls updating of personal “types” from
behavior. The circuitry which controls attributions of pay-
off types to people, from their behavior, requires a concept
of how types link to behavior (i.e., what are types?), as well
as updating of types (i.e., reputations) from behavior. An
autist with theory of mind deficits, for example, might
keep very accurate counts of relative frequencies (in fact,
many autists are obsessed with counting objects in special
categories) but be unable to tell whether a person behaved
badly in a game because of bad intentions or situational
influences (such as a bureaucrat who is pressured to stick
to rules). So there is no reason to think that updating about
event frequencies is necessarily the same as updating
about personal types.
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The existence of domain-specific expertise
suggests that people will appear to be
geniuses at some tasks but will seem
remarkably flat-footed when dealing with
other tasks that may be only superficially dif-
ferent. Domain-specific processing has
important implications for economics, and
specifically for the organization of labor.
Bundling tasks together into jobs, for exam-
ple, requires an understanding of which kind
of skills are general (useful for many tasks)
and which are neurally separate.
4.3 Utility for Money
As discussed earlier, neuroscience can
point out commonalities between categories
that had been viewed as distinct. An example
of this with important implications for eco-
nomics is the utility for money. The canoni-
cal economic model assumes that the utility
for money is indirect—i.e., that money is a
mere counter, only valued for the goods and
services it can procure. Thus, standard eco-
nomics would view, say, the pleasure from
food or cocaine and the “pleasure” from
obtaining money as two totally different phe-
nomena. Neural evidence suggests, however,
that the same dopaminergic reward circuitry
of the brain in the midbrain (mesolimbic sys-
tem) is activated for a wide variety of differ-
ent reinforcers (Montague and Berns 2002),
including attractive faces (Itzhak Aharon et
al. 2001), funny cartoons (Dean Mobbs et al.
2003), cultural objects like sports cars
(Susanne Erk et al. 2002), drugs (Schultz
2002), and money (e.g., Hans Breiter et al.
2001; Brian Knutson and Richard Peterson,
in press; Delgado et al. 2000). This suggests
that money provides direct reinforcement.
Figure 4 is a rough guess about the neural
circuitry of reward (from Schultz 2002). It is
useful as a pictorial reminder that, while neu-
roscience (and our review) often emphasize
specific regions which are central in different
kinds of processing, the focus in thinking
about economic decisions should be on cir-
cuitry or systems of regions and how they
interact. The diagram also shows how frontal
regions (at the top of Figure 4) both receive
input from “lower” systems (dopaminergic
neurons and the amygdala), and also feed
back processed information to the striatum.
The idea that many rewards are processed
similarly in the brain has important implica-
tions for economics, which assumes that the
marginal utility of money depends on what
money buys. Of course, it is possible that
money rewards activate the same circuitry as
sports cars, cocaine, and jokes because the
circuitry is being used to evaluate money in
terms of the goods that it buys (which
requires a cortical process that “simulates”
the value of those goods internally to the
brain). But it is also possible that money
becomes what psychologists call a “primary
reinforcer,” which means that people value
money without carefully computing what
they plan to buy with it. Neuroeconomics is
not nearly advanced enough to separate these
two roles for midbrain responses to money,
but suggests the possibility that the brain
value of money is only loosely linked to con-
sumption utility, which in turn suggests a
wide range of potential experiments to
explore implications.
An example of how consumption-driven
and primary reinforcement from money can
matter is asset pricing. Since Robert Lucas
(1978), many models of stock prices have
assumed that investors care about the utili-
ty of consumption they can finance with
stock market returns, rather than with
returns per se. Simple models of this sort
make many counterfactual predictions—
most famously that the “equity premium,”
or marginal return to stocks over bonds,
would be much lower than it has actually
been if investors only disliked risk because
of its impact on consumption, as conven-
tional models assume. Shlomo Benartzi and
Richard Thaler (1995) and Nicholas
Barberis, Tano Santos, and Ming Huang
(2001) have had more success explaining
returns patterns using a model in which
investors care directly about stock returns.
This alternative assumption fits a brain that
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Figure 4. Hypothesized neural circuitry of reward processing (Schultz 2000).
gets a kick out of earning high returns for
their own sake.
If gaining money provides direct pleasure,
then the experience of parting with it is
probably painful. While there is no direct
evidence that paying is painful, the assump-
tion that paying hurts can explain many mar-
ket phenomena which are otherwise
puzzling (Drazen Prelec and Loewenstein
1998). An example is the effect of payment-
neutral pricing schemes on choices.
Companies often go to great lengths to dis-
guise payments, or reduce their pain.
Consumers appear to oversubscribe to flat-
rate payment plans for utilities and tele-
phone service and health clubs (Kenneth
Train 1991; Train, Daniel McFadden, and
Moshe Ben-Akiva 1987; Della Vigna and
Ulrike Malmendier 2003, Anja Lambrecht
and Bernd Skiera 2004). A flat-rate plan
eliminates marginal costs and allows con-
sumers to enjoy the service without thinking
about the marginal cost. Similarly, travel
plans are often sold as packages, making it
impossible to compute the cost of the indi-
vidual components (hotel, food, transporta-
tion). Often components of the package are
presented as “free” (like Microsoft’s internet
browser) even though the claim is meaning-
less from an economic standpoint, given that
the package is presented on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis. One can interpret the appeal
of ad-hoc currencies, such as frequent-flyer
miles, chips in casinos, or the beads used for
incidental expenses at all-inclusive resorts
like Club Med, as an attempt to reduce the
pain-of-payment. The ad-hoc currency,
whether miles or beads, feels like “play
money,” and spending it does not seem to
exact the same psychic cost.
In experiments, we have observed a prefer-
ence for prepayment for certain items, even
where prepayment is financially irrational
because it incurs an opportunity cost of lost
interest payments (Prelec and Loewenstein
1998). When questioned, respondents claim
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to prefer prepayment for, e.g., a vacation trip
because then they could relax and enjoy the
vacation more knowing it was paid up. It is an
interesting question whether part of the
motive for owning rather than renting prod-
ucts is precisely to create prepayment, and so
enjoy consumption without being reminded of
the cost. The pain-of-paying may also explain
why we are willing to pay less for a product if
paying in cash than by credit card. Although
there are financial reasons to prefer paying by
credit-card, the size of credit card relative to
cash premium that people reveal, in an exper-
iment, is much too high (up to 100 percent) to
be rationalized by liquidity preference and
other economic considerations (Prelec and
Duncan Simester 2001).
4.4 Wanting and Liking
Economists usually view behavior as a
search for pleasure (or, equivalently, escape
from pain). The subfield of welfare econom-
ics, and the entire ability of economists to
make normative statements, is premised on
the idea that giving people what they want
makes them better off. But, there is consid-
erable evidence from neuroscience and
other areas of psychology that the motivation
to take an action is not always closely tied to
hedonic consequences.
Berridge (1996) argues that decision mak-
ing involves the interaction of two separate,
though overlapping systems, one responsi-
ble for pleasure and pain (the “liking” sys-
tem), and the other for motivation (the
“wanting” system). This challenges the fun-
damental supposition in economics that one
only strives to obtain what one likes.
Berridge finds that certain lesions and phar-
macological interventions can selectively
enhance a rat’s willingness to work for a
food, without changing the pleasure of eat-
ing the food, as measured, admittedly some-
what questionably, by the animal’s facial
expression (Animal facial expressions, like
those of humans, provide at least a clue
about whether something tastes good, bad
or indifferent. In economic language, the
experiments create a situation where the
utility of food and disutility of work remain
the same, but the amount of work-for-
reward goes up. This implies that it is possi-
ble to be motivated to take actions that bring
no pleasure.
Berridge believes that the later stages of
many drug addictions presents prototypical
examples of situations of what he terms
“wanting” without “liking”; drug addicts
often report an absence of pleasure from
taking the drugs they are addicted to, cou-
pled with an irresistible motivation to do so.
Other examples of situations in which there
often seems to be a disconnect between
one’s motivation to obtain something and
the pleasure one is likely to derive from it
are sex and curiosity (Loewenstein 1994).
Thus, for example, you can be powerfully
motivated to seek out information, even
when you are quite certain that it will make
you miserable, and can feel quite unmotivat-
ed to engage in activities that, at a purely
cognitive level, you are quite sure you would
find deeply pleasurable.
Economics proceeds on the assumption
that satisfying people’s wants is a good thing.
This assumption depends on knowing that
people will like what they want. If likes and
wants diverge, this would pose a fundamen-
tal challenge to standard welfare economics.
Presumably welfare should be based on
“liking.” But if we cannot infer what people
like from what they want and choose, then
an alternative method for measuring liking
is needed, while avoiding an oppressive
paternalism.
4.5 Cognitive Inaccessibility
The fact that people lack introspective
access to the sources of their own judg-
ments of behavior, and tend to overattribute
both to controlled processes, has many
important implications for economics.
When it comes to discriminatory biases, for
example, because people lack introspective
access to the processes that produce such
biases, they are unable to correct for them
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even when they are motivated to make
impartial judgments and decisions. Indeed,
they are very likely to deny that they are
biased and, hence, likely to not even per-
ceive the need for such correction. Such
unconscious discrimination may explain
why otherwise identical job application
resumes for candidates with statistically
“white” rather than “African–American”
names have a 50 percent higher chance of
generating callbacks from job application
letters, as shown recently by Marianne
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). It can
also help explain why physicians are so con-
vinced that gifts from pharmaceutical com-
panies do not bias their prescription
practices even though research (and the
continuing practice of gift giving by the
companies) suggests that it does (Jason
Dana and Loewenstein 2003).
A second class of implications is related to
the phenomena of apparent self-deception
and self-manipulation, where, for instance,
economic agents (investors, consumers,
entrepreneurs) are overly optimistic about
their chances for success. These phenomena
have been richly catalogued by social psy-
chologists, beginning with the research on
motivated cognition and cognitive disso-
nance in the 1950s. Neuroscience suggests
that they are all related to chronic cognitive
inaccessibility of automatic brain processes.
Attention, for example, is largely controlled
by automatic processes, and attention in
turn determines what information we
absorb. If attention is chronically drawn to
information that is favorable to us, we will
emerge with an overoptimistic sense of our
abilities and prospects. It is a case of quad-
rants III and IV collaborating, without the
“adult supervision” provided by quadrant I.
A third class of implications arises from the
cognitive inaccessibility of our own motives
for action. The fact that we are not con-
sciously aware of the moment of decision (as
shown by Libet’s research, mentioned in the
previous section) strongly suggests that we
may also not understand the reasons why we
choose one way or another. Paradoxically, this
can be very beneficial. In many situations, an
action may be diagnostic of a good outcome,
without having any significant ability to cause
that outcome. For instance, participating in
some socially desirable activity (e.g., voting or
not littering) may be quite diagnostic of the
desired collective outcome (your candidate
winning, clean streets) without being able to
cause that outcome, because the impact of
your action is negligible. This gives rise to the
notorious “voter’s paradox” in rational choice
theory, which seems to imply that no one
should ever vote. Fortunately, the distinction
between diagnosticity and causality, which is
absolute in the rational-choice model, is quite
fuzzy psychologically. There is experimental
evidence that people will cheat on their own
medical tests so as to “manufacture” a good
diagnosis (George Quattrone and Amos
Tversky 1984), and their own personality
inventories, to yield a personality assessment
diagnostic of success. This can only be possi-
ble if the true motive for action — the desire
to get “good news” — is hidden from the
agent at the moment of choice; if it were not
hidden, then awareness that the action was
taken precisely to get the good news would
instantly void the diagnostic value of the
action (see Ronit Bodner and Prelec 2003 for
an economic self-signaling model that allows
for noncausal motives on action). Cognitive
inaccessibility prevents this logical short-cir-
cuit and dramatically expands the range of
motives that can influence behavior. Because
the hedonic system (quadrant IV) is not con-
strained by logical considerations, a person
who takes a small step toward a larger virtu-
ous objective, such as joining a gym to get fit,
or buying a copy of Stephen Hawking’s A
Brief History of Time to feel scientifically lit-
erate, may experience a feeling of pleasure
from the small step “as if” they have in fact
secured their objective (which they most like-
ly will not). At the same time, cognitive inac-
cessibility means that quadrant I doesn’t have
to acknowledge that the feeling of pleasure
was in fact the cause of his action.
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5. Specific Economic Applications
We now go into greater detail about rami-
fications of neuroscience findings for four
specific topics in economics: intertemporal
choice, decision making under risk and
uncertainty, game theory, and labor-market
discrimination.
5.1 Intertemporal Choice and Self-Control
The standard perspective in economics
views intertemporal choice as a trade-off of
utility at different points in time. Individual
differences in the way that people make this
tradeoff are captured by the notion of a dis-
count rate—a rate at which people discount
future utilities as a function of when they
occur. The notion of discounting, however,
gained currency not because of any support-
ive evidence, but based only on its conven-
ient similarity to financial net present value
calculations (Loewenstein 1992). Indeed, in
the article that first proposed DU in detail,
Samuelson (1937) explicitly questioned its
descriptive validity, saying “It is completely
arbitrary to assume that the individual
behaves so as to maximize an integral of the
form envisaged in [the DU model].”
In fact, more recent empirical research on
time discounting challenges the idea that
people discount all future utilities at a con-
stant rate (see Frederick, Loewenstein, and
O’Donoghue 2002). The notion of time dis-
counting, it seems, neither describes the
behavior of individuals nor helps us to classi-
fy individuals in a useful fashion. How can an
understanding of the brain help us to estab-
lish a better understanding of intertemporal
choice behavior? Our two central distinc-
tions, between affect and cognition, and
between automatic and controlled processes,
both have important ramifications.
5.1.1 Affect and Cognition in Intertemporal
Choice
As discussed above, the affective system is
designed to ensure that certain survival and
reproduction functions are met and it
achieves this function in part by motivating
individuals to take certain actions. In most ani-
mals, emotions and drives motivate behaviors
that have short-term goals, such as eating,
drinking, and copulating. As a result, the
affective systems that we share with wide
range of other animals are inherently myopic.
Though some animals display far-sighted
behaviors, such as storing food for winter,
these are specialized, preprogrammed, behav-
iors that are distinctly different from the type
of spontaneous delay of gratification observed
in humans. Humans appear to be unique
among animals in terms of caring about, mak-
ing immediate sacrifices for, and flexibly
responding to, desired future consequences.
This capacity to take long-term conse-
quences of our behavior into account seems
to be the product of our prefrontal cortex,
which, tellingly, is the part of the brain that
is uniquely human (see, e.g., Manuck et al.
2003). Patients with damage to prefrontal
regions—most famously Phineas Gage,
whose injury led to a reformulation of our
understanding of the function of the pre-
frontal cortex—tend to behave myopically,
paying little heed to the delayed conse-
quences of their behavior. As Hersh Shefrin
and Thaler (1988) suggested many years ago,
intertemporal choice can be viewed as a
splice of two processes—an impulsive, affec-
tive, process and a more far-sighted process
guided by the prefrontal cortex.
Recent brain imaging research provides
support for such an account. Samuel
McClure et al. (2004) scanned subjects using
fMRI while they made a series of preference
judgments between monetary reward options
that varied by amount and delay to delivery.
For some pairs of choices, the earlier reward
would be received immediately; for others,
both rewards were delayed (though one by
more than the other). Consistent with the
idea that intertemporal choice is driven by
two systems, one more cognitive and one
more deliberative, they found that parts of
the limbic—i.e., affective—system associated
with the midbrain dopamine system were
mr05_Article 1  3/28/05  3:25 PM  Page 39
40 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIII (March 2005)
preferentially activated by options involving
immediately available rewards. In contrast,
regions of the lateral prefrontal cortex and
posterior parietal cortex—typically viewed as
more cognitive regions—were engaged uni-
formly by intertemporal choices irrespective
of delay. Furthermore, the relative activity of
the two systems actually predicted the choic-
es that subjects made: Greater relative activ-
ity in affective systems was associated with
choosing earlier rewards more often.
The notion of quasi-hyperbolic time dis-
counting, of course, provides a mathematical
representation of precisely such a splicing of
two processes, and has been shown to use-
fully describe behavior in a wide range of
domains. However, an understanding of the
neural underpinnings of these dual process-
es allows for more nuanced predictions and
formulations. The notion of hyperbolic time-
discounting predicts that people will always
behave impulsively when faced with the
right combination of incentives (typically
those involving some immediate cost and
benefit), but this does not seem to be the
case. Understanding that hyperbolic time
discounting stems, in part, from competition
between the affective and cognitive systems,
leads to the prediction that factors that
strengthen or weaken one or the other of
these influences will cause people to behave
more or less impulsively.
5.1.2 Determinants of the Relative Strength
of Affect and Cognition
There are a variety of factors that affect the
relative strength of affective and cognitive
influences on intertemporal choice which
can help to explain what could be called
“intraindividual” variability in impatience.
First, any factor that increases the demands
on the prefrontal cortex—on the controlled,
cognitive, system, should decrease the influ-
ence of this system and, hence, decrease indi-
viduals’ control over their own behavior. This
possibility was demonstrated by Baba Shiv
and Alexander Fedorikhin (1999). To manip-
ulate “cognitive load,” half of their subjects
(low-load) were given a two-digit number that
they were instructed to memorize, and the
other half (high load) were given a seven-digit
number to memorize. Subjects were then
instructed to walk to another room in the
building. On the way they passed by a table at
which they were presented with a choice
between a caloric slice of cake or a bowl of
fruit salad. More than half (59 percent) chose
the cake in the high load (seven-digit) condi-
tion, but only 37 percent chose the cake in the
low load (two-digit number) condition. This
finding is consistent with the idea that the
effort required to memorize seven-digit num-
bers drew deliberative resources away from
self-control, leading those subjects who had
to remember more to eat more cake.
Second, prior exercise of self-control
seems to diminish the capacity and, hence,
propensity to exert self-control in the present.
Recall that the prefrontal cortex is the part of
the brain that is associated with a subjective
feeling of effort. It is tempting to attribute
this to the fact that self-control involves the
same part of the brain—the executive pre-
frontal cortex—that is itself associated with
feelings of mental effort. Perhaps this is why
exercising willpower feels so difficult, and
why exercising self-control in one domain can
undermine its exercise in another, as demon-
strated by a series of clever experiments con-
ducted by Baumeister and colleagues (see,
e.g., Baumeister and Kathleen Vohs 2003). In
a typical study, subjects on diets who resisted
temptation (by foregoing the chance to grab
snacks from a nearby basket) later ate more
ice cream in an ice-cream taste test and also
quit earlier when confronted with an intellec-
tual problem they couldn’t solve. They acted
as if their ability to resist temptation was tem-
porarily “used up” by resisting the snacks (or,
alternatively, that they had “earned” a reward
of ice cream by skipping the tempting
snacks). Other factors that seem to under-
mine this self-control resource are alcohol,
stress, and sleep deprivation.
Turning to the other side of the equation,
activation of affective states should, by the
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same token, tend to accentuate temporal
myopia. Indeed, there is considerable evi-
dence of such effects (Janet Metcalfe and
Mischel 1999). Research has shown, for
example, that addicts display higher discount
rates, not only for drugs but also for money,
when they are currently craving drugs than
when they are not (Giordano et al. 2002).
Other research has shown that sexual arousal
produces greater time-discounting of money
rewards (Ariely and Loewenstein 2003).
The main exceptions to the rule that affec-
tive states tend to engender short-sighted
behavior involve interactions between the
cognitive and affective systems. In fact, deci-
sions to delay gratification often involve a
mixture of affect and cognition. They
require a cognitive awareness of the delayed
benefits in delaying gratification—e.g., that
desisting from eating cake today will mean a
more pleasing body type in the future. But,
as many researchers have observed, cogni-
tive awareness alone is insufficient to moti-
vate delay of gratification; emotions play a
critical role in forward-looking decision
making. As Barlow (1988) notes, “The capac-
ity to experience anxiety and the capacity to
plan, are two sides of the same coin.”
Thomas Cottle and Stephen Klineberg
(1974), similarly argue that people care
about the delayed consequences of their
decisions only to the degree that contem-
plating such consequences evokes immedi-
ate affect. In support of this view, they cite
the effects of frontal lobotomies which harm
areas of the brain that underlie the capacity
for images of absent events to generate
experiences of pleasure or discomfort. The
neurosurgeons who performed these opera-
tions wrote of their frontal-lobotomy
patients that: “the capacity for imagination is
still present, and certainly not sufficiently
reduced to render the patients helpless, and
affective responses are often quite lively,
[but there is] a separation of one from the
other” (Freeman and Watts 1942).
The work of Damasio and colleagues dis-
cussed earlier (Bechara, Damasio, Daniel
Tranel, and Damasio 1997; Damasio 1994)
lends further credence to this perspective,
as does research on psychopaths, who are
characterized by both emotional deficits
when it comes to imagining the future and
by insensitivity to the future consequences
(as well as consequences to others) of their
behavior (Hervey Cleckley 1941; Hare
1965, 1966; David Lykken 1957). Whether
deliberately, as when one conjures up an
image of a “fat self” exposed on the beach,
or without conscious intention, self-control
often involves an interaction of affective and
cognitive mechanisms.
How might one model intertemporal
choice differently as a result of the insights
from neuroscience? First, the neuroscience
research points to ways to “unpack” the con-
cept of time preference. Clearly, ability to
think about future consequences is impor-
tant, which is probably why time preference
is correlated with measured intelligence
(Mischel and Robert Metzner 1962).
Second, because people are likely to make
myopic choices when under the influence of
powerful drives or emotions (Loewenstein
1996), this suggests that a key to under-
standing impulsivity in individuals might be
to understand what types of situations get
them “hot.” Third, we might be tempted to
look for individual differences in what could
be called “willpower”—i.e., the availability
of the scarce internal resource that allows
people to inhibit viscerally driven behaviors
(see Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 2004 for
a recent two-system model of intertemporal
choice and other economic behaviors).
A model of intertemporal choice that took
account of interactions between affect and
cognition can help to explain not only impul-
sivity, but also why many people have self-
control problems of the opposite type of
those typically examined in the literature—
e.g., tightwads who can’t get themselves to
spend enough; workaholics who can’t take a
break, and people who, far from losing con-
trol in the bedroom, find themselves frus-
tratingly unable to do so. All of these patterns
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of behavior can easily be explained by the
possibly uniquely human propensity to expe-
rience emotions, such as fear, as a result of
thinking about the future. Indeed, it is likely
that one of the main tools that the prefrontal
cortex uses to impose self-control when
affective forces would otherwise favor short-
sighted self-destructive behavior is to create
“deliberative affect” via directed imagery and
thought (Roger Giner-Sorolla 2001).
Such a framework might also help to
explain why people appear so inconsistent
when their behavior is viewed through the
lens of discounted utility. The ability to think
about future consequences may not be
strongly correlated with the degree to which
different experiences produce visceral reac-
tions, and these in turn might not be corre-
lated with an individual’s level of willpower.
Indeed, Loewenstein et al. (2001) found
close to zero correlations between numerous
behaviors that all had an important intertem-
poral component, but much higher correla-
tions between behaviors that seemed to
draw on the same dimension of intertempo-
ral choice—e.g., which required suppression
of specific emotions such as anger.
5.1.3 Automatic Processes in Intertemporal
Choice
To the extent that intertemporal choice is,
in fact, driven by cognitive considerations,
much of this cognition does not take the usu-
ally assumed form of a weighing of costs and
benefits discounted according to when they
occur in time. Rather, consistent with the ear-
lier claim that people often make decisions via
a two-part process that takes the form of first
asking “what situation am I in?” then continu-
ing “how does one behave in such a situation,”
much intertemporal choice is driven by auto-
matic processes involving pattern-matching,
recognition, and categorization.
A pattern of choice that seems to be driven
by such a process is the preference for
sequences of outcomes that improve over
time. In one demonstration of this effect,
Loewenstein and Prelec (1993) asked some
subjects to choose whether to eat a fancy
French Restaurant dinner in one month or
two, and others to choose between the
sequence [fancy French this month, eat at
home next month] or the same choice in
reverse order. A majority of subjects preferred
the isolated French dinner earlier but
deferred the French dinner when it was
embedded in a sequence with eating at home.
Frederick and Loewenstein (2000) conducted
a study in which subjects were presented with
a series of intertemporal choices that were
framed in ways intended to evoke different
considerations. For example, in one version
they asked respondents to allocate pleasurable
outcomes, such as massages, over time. They
expected, and found, that the allocation for-
mat evoked a choice heuristic that caused peo-
ple to spread consumption relatively evenly
over time, implying a preference for flat
sequences. In another version, they asked
respondents to state a maximum buying price
for the Greek-then-French and French-then-
Greek sequences, rather than choose between
them, anticipating that the mention of money
would evoke considerations of the time value
of money and, hence, cause subjects to place
higher value on the option that provided
greater value earlier—i.e., the declining
sequences—which is what they found.20
20 Another phenomenon that may be driven by such
automatic processes is the “diversification bias” (Itamar
Simonson 1989). When people choose several alternatives
from a set, they choose more variety when they choose
them all simultaneously than when they choose them
sequentially. This phenomenon has been demonstrated
with snack food, audio pieces, gambles, and lottery tick-
ets. Daniel Read and Loewenstein (1995) tested various
explanations for overdiversification (e.g., they diversify in
simultaneous choice to gather information), but conclud-
ed that it results from a rule of thumb that that they apply
whenever choices are expressed in a fashion that high-
lights diversification (see also Thomas Langer and Craig
Fox 2004). This viewpoint is supported by a study (Read,
Loewenstein, and S. Kalyanaraman 1999) in which sub-
jects make successive choices between groups of objects
which are easily categorized or not. When categorization
was easy (e.g., virtues and vices), subjects diversified
more in simultaneous than in sequential choice. When
there were multiple competing categorizations, the 
overdiversification bias disappeared.
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In sum, neuroscience points to some defi-
ciencies in the way that economists currently
model intertemporal choice and also suggests
directions for future modeling. A somewhat
stylized interterpretation of the results just
reviewed would be that some intertemporal
decisions are, in fact, well represented by the
discounted utility model—specifically those
involving detailed deliberation but minimal
affect. However, a wide range of other
intertemporal choices are influenced by
affectively “hot” processes such as drives and
emotions, or result from processes that auto-
matically evoke a response which depends on
the situation. Models which focus on how
these discrepant processes interact are prom-
ising (e.g., Bernheim and Rangel 2004;
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 2004).
5.2 Decision-Making under Risk and
Uncertainty
Both collaboration and competition
between affect and cognition, and between
controlled and automatic processes, can also
be seen in the domain of decision making
under risk and uncertainty.
5.2.1 Affect versus Cognition
The expected utility model views decision
making under uncertainty as a tradeoff of
utility under different states of nature—i.e.,
different possible scenarios. But, much as
they do toward delayed outcomes, people
react to risks at two different levels. On the
one hand, as posited by traditional econom-
ic theories and consistent with quadrant I of
table 1, people do attempt to evaluate the
objective level of risk that different hazards
could pose. On the other hand, and consis-
tent with quadrant IV, people also react to
risks at an emotional level, and these emo-
tional reactions can powerfully influence
their behavior (Loewenstein, Weber,
Christopher Hsee, and Ned Welch 2001).
The existence of separate affective and
cognitive systems that respond differently to
risks is most salient when the two systems
clash. People are often “of two minds” when
it comes to risks; we drive (or wish we were
driving as we sit white-knuckled in our air-
plane seat) when we know at a cognitive level
that it is safer to fly. We fear terrorism, when
red meat poses a much greater risk of mor-
tality. And, when it comes to asking someone
out on a date, getting up to speak at the podi-
um, or taking an important exam, our delib-
erative self uses diverse tactics to get us to
take risks, or to perform in the face of risks,
that our visceral self would much prefer to
avoid. Perhaps the most dramatic illustra-
tions of the separation of visceral reactions
and cognitive evaluations, however, comes
from the phobias that so many people suffer
from; the very hallmark of a phobia is to be
unable to face a risk that one recognizes,
objectively, to be harmless. Moreover, fear
unleashes preprogrammed sequences of
behavior that aren’t always beneficial. Thus,
when fear becomes too intense it can pro-
duce counterproductive responses such as
freezing, panicking, or “dry-mouth” when
speaking in public. The fact that people pay
for therapy to deal with their fears, and take
drugs (including alcohol) to overcome them,
can be viewed as further “evidence” that peo-
ple, or more accurately, people’s deliberative
selves, are not at peace with their visceral
reactions to risks.
5.2.2 Affective Reactions to Uncertainty
A lot is known about the neural processes
underlying affective responses to risks.
Much risk averse behavior is driven by
immediate fear responses to risks, and fear,
in turn, seems to be largely traceable to the
amygdala. The amygdala constantly scans
incoming stimuli for indications of potential
threat and responds to inputs both from
automatic and controlled processes in the
brain. Patrik Vuilleumier et al. (2001)
observed equivalent amygdala activation in
response to fearful faces that were visually
attended to or in the peripheral region which
falls outside of conscious perception (cf. de
Beatrice de Gelder, Jean Vroomen, Gilles
Pourtois, and Lawrence Weiskrantz 1999;
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Nouchine Hadjikhani and de Gelder 2003;
LeDoux 1996; John Morris, C. Buchel, and
Raymond Dolan 2001; Whalen et al. 1998).
But the amygdala also receives cortical
inputs, which can moderate or even override
its automatic quadrant IV response.
In a paradigmatic experiment that illus-
trates cortical overriding of amygdala activa-
tion (LeDoux 1996), an animal such as a rat
is “fear-conditioned”—by repeatedly admin-
istering a signal such as a tone followed by
administration of a painful electric shock.
Once the tone becomes associated in the
animal’s mind with the shock, the animal
responds to the tone by jumping or showing
other over signs of fear. In the next phase of
the experiment, the tone is played repeated-
ly without administering the shock, until the
fear response becomes gradually “extin-
guished.” At this point, one might think that
the animal has “unlearned” the connection
between the tone and the shock, but the
reality is more complicated and interesting.
If the neural connections between the cortex
and the amygdala are then severed, the orig-
inal fear response to the tone reappears,
which shows that fear conditioning is not
erased in “extinction” but is suppressed by
the cortex and remains latent in the amyg-
dala. This suggests that fear learning may be
permanent, which could be an evolutionarily
useful adaptation because it permits a rapid
relearning if the original cause of the fear
reappears. Indeed, other studies (reported
in the same book) show that fear-condition-
ing can be reinstated by the administration
of a single shock.
Decision making under risk and uncer-
tainty, like intertemporal choice, nicely illus-
trates both collaboration and competition
between systems. When it comes to collabo-
ration, risk taking (or avoiding) behavior
involves an exquisite interplay of cognitive
and affective processes. In a well-known
study that illustrates such collaboration
(Bechara et al. 1997), patients suffering pre-
frontal damage (which, as discussed above,
produces a disconnect between cognitive
and affective systems) and normal subjects
chose a sequence of cards from four decks
whose payoffs the subjects only learned from
experience (a “multiarmed bandit” prob-
lem). Two decks had more cards with
extreme wins and losses (and negative
expected value); two decks had less extreme
outcomes but positive expected value. Both
groups exhibited similar skin conductance
(sweating—an indication of fear) after large-
loss cards were encountered, but, compared
to normals, prefrontal subjects rapidly
returned to the high-paying risky decks after
suffering a loss and, as a result, went “bank-
rupt” more often. Although the immediate
emotional reaction of the prefrontal patients
to losses was the same as the reaction of nor-
mals (measured by skin conductance), the
damaged patients apparently do not store
the pain of remembered losses as well as nor-
mals, so their skin conductance rose much
less than normals when they resampled the
high risk decks. Subsequent research found a
similar difference between normal subjects
who were either high or low in terms of emo-
tional reactivity to negative events. Those
who were more reactive were more prone to
sample from the lower-paying, safer decks of
cards (Peters and Slovic 2000).
Damasio et al.’s research shows that
insufficient fear can produce nonmaximiz-
ing behavior when risky options have nega-
tive value. But, it is well established that
fear can also discourage people from taking
advantageous gambles (see, e.g., Uri
Gneezy and Jan Potters 1997). Indeed, Shiv
et al. (2005) found that frontal patients
actually make more money on a task in
which negative emotions cause normal sub-
jects to be extremely risk averse: a series of
take-it-or-leave-it choices to play a gamble
with a 50 percent chance of losing $1.00 or
gaining $1.50. Normal subjects and frontal
subjects were about equally likely to play
the gamble on the first round, but normals
stopped playing when they experienced
losses, while frontal patients kept playing.
Clearly, having frontal damage undermines
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the overall quality of decision making; but
there are situations in which frontal damage
can result in superior decisions.
At a more macro level, emotional reac-
tions to risk can help to explain risk-seeking
as well as risk-aversion (Caplin and Leahy
2001). Thus, when gambling is pleasurable, a
model that incorporates affect naturally pre-
dicts that people will be risk-seeking and
that self-control will be required to rein in
risk-taking. Indeed, about 1 percent of the
people who gamble are diagnosed as “patho-
logical”—they report losing control, “chasing
losses,” and harming their personal and work
relationships by gambling (National
Academy of Sciences 1999). The standard
economic explanations for gambling—con-
vex utility for money or a special taste for the
act of gambling—don’t help explain why
some gamblers binge and don’t usefully
inform policies to regulate availability of
gambling. Neuroscience may help.
Pathological gamblers tend to be over-
whelmingly male and tend to also drink,
smoke, and use drugs much more frequent-
ly than average. Genetic evidence shows that
a certain gene allele (D2A1), which causes
gamblers to seek larger and larger thrills to
get modest jolts of pleasure, is more likely to
be present in pathological gamblers than in
normal people (David Comings 1998). One
study shows tentatively that treatment with
naltrexone, a drug that blocks the operation
of opiate receptors in the brain, reduces the
urge to gamble (e.g., Paula Moreyra et al.
2000). The same drug has been used to suc-
cessfully treat “compulsive shopping” (Susan
McElroy et al. 1991).
Neural evidence also substantiates the dis-
tinction between risk (known probability)
and “Knightian” uncertainty, or ambiguity.
Subjects facing ambiguous gambles—know-
ing they lack information they would like to
have about the odds—often report a feeling
of discomfort or mild fear. Brain imaging
shows that different degrees of risk and
uncertainty activate different areas of the
brain (McCabe et al. 2001; Aldo Rustichini
et al. 2002) which corroborates the subjects’
self-reports. Using fMRI, Ming Hsu et al.
(2005) found frontal insula and amygdala
activation when subjects faced ambiguous
choices, compared to risky ones. They also
found that patients with orbitofrontal corti-
cal (OFC) lesions are ambiguity-neutral,
compared to brain-damaged controls. Since
the OFC receives input from the limbic sys-
tem (including the insula and amygdala), the
fMRI and lesion evidence together imply
that in normal subjects, ambiguous gambles
often create discomfort or fear which is
transmitted to the OFC. Ironically, patients
with OFC brain damage therefore behave
more “rationally” (treating ambiguous and
risky gambles similarly) than normals, a
reminder that logical principles of rationality
and biological adaptations can be different
(cf. Shiv et al. 2005).
5.2.3 Automatic Versus Controlled
Processes
The divergence between different sys-
tems’ evaluations of risk can also be seen
when it comes to judgments of probability.
Numerous studies by psychologists have
observed systematic divergences between
explicit judgments of probability in different
settings (presumably the product of con-
trolled processing) and implicit judgments
or judgments derived from choice (which
are more closely associated with automatic
processing and/or emotion). For example,
Kirkpatrick and Epstein (1992) found that
people prefer to draw a bean from a bowl
containing ten winning beans and ninety
losing beans than from a bowl containing
one winning bean and nine losing beans (see
also Veronika Denes-Raj, Epstein, and
Jonathon Cole 1995; Paul Windschitl and
Gary Wells 1998). Subjects say that they
know the probabilities of winning are the
same, but they still have an automatic quad-
rant III preference for the bowl with more
winning beans.
An important feature of good probability
judgment is logical coherence: probabilities
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of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events
should add to one, and conditional probabil-
ities should be linked to joint and marginal
probability according to Bayes rule
(P(A|B)=P(A and B)/P(B)). Logical coher-
ence is violated in at least two neurally
interesting ways. One is “conjunction falla-
cy”—the tendency to judge events with two
components A and B as more likely than A
or B alone. While most subjects (even statis-
tically sophisticated ones) make conjunction
errors on some problems, when those errors
are pointed out, quadrant I wakes up, and
the subjects sheepishly recognize the error
and correct it (Kahneman and Frederick
2002). For example, the famous “Linda”
problem describes an earnest young politi-
cally minded student. In one condition, sub-
jects are asked to rank statements about
Linda—Is she a bank teller? A feminist bank
teller? A large majority of subjects, even
highly educated ones, say Linda is more
likely to be a feminist bank teller than she is
to be a bank teller, a violation of the con-
junction principle. But when subjects are
asked, “Out of one hundred people like
Linda, how many are bank tellers? Feminist
bank tellers?” conjunction errors disappear
(Tversky and Kahneman 1983).
Another violation is that subjects often
report probabilities which are logically inco-
herent. fMRI evidence suggests an explana-
tion for why probability judgments are
incoherent, but can be corrected upon
reflection: when guessing probabilities, the
left hemisphere of the brain is more active;
but when answering logic questions, the
right hemisphere is more active (Lawrence
Parsons and Daniel Osherson 2001). Since
enforcing logical coherence requires the
right hemisphere to “check the work” of the
left hemisphere, there is room for slippage.
Once again, it can be seen that neuro-
science, and specifically, a consideration of
affective and automatic processes that have
been largely neglected by economists, could
potentially inform an important line of
research and theory. We are skeptical of
21 Of course, equilibration might occur through a
process other than introspection—e.g., adaptive learning,
imitation, communication, or evolution. But these processes
must have a neural basis too.
whether any theory that fails to incorporate
the affective dimensions of risk will be capa-
ble of shedding much light on such important
phenomena as stock market booms and busts,
the ubiquity of gambling (e.g., slot machines
revenues dwarf revenues from movies), and
the vicissitudes of public responses to threats
as diverse as terrorism and global warming.
5.3 Game Theory
Neuroscientific data are well-suited to
exploring the central assumptions on which
game theory predictions rest. These assump-
tions are that players: (1) have accurate
beliefs about what others will do (i.e., play-
ers are in equilibrium); (2) have no emotions
or concern about how much others earn (a
useful auxiliary assumption); (3) plan ahead;
and (4) learn from experience.
5.3.1 Theory of Mind and Autism
In strategic interactions (games), knowing
how another person thinks, and how anoth-
er person thinks you think, etc., is critical to
predicting the other person’s behavior (and
for inferring the other player’s intentions,
which underlie emotional judgments of fair-
ness and obliged reciprocity in more mod-
ern theories (e.g., Rabin 1993). From a
neural view, iterated strategic thinking con-
sumes scarce working memory and also
requires a player to put herself in another
player’s “mind.” There may be no generic
human capacity to iterate this kind of think-
ing beyond a couple of steps.21 Studies that
examine either subject’s choices, or that
monitor what type of information subjects
look up or pay attention to in experimental
games, suggest only one–two steps of strate-
gic thinking are typical in most populations
(e.g., Eric Johnson et al. 2002; Miguel
Costa-Gomes et al. 2001; Camerer, Teck
Ho, and Kuan Chong 2004), though up to
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22 Grether et al. (2004) also find BA 10 activity, along
with interesting activity in anterior cingulate and the basal
forebrain, as subjects bid in second-price auctions.
three–four steps are observed in analytically
skilled and specially trained populations.
As discussed in section 4.2, many neuro-
scientists believe there is a specialized
“mind-reading” (or “theory of mind”) area,
perhaps in prefrontal area Brodmann 10,
which generates reasoning about what oth-
ers believe and might do (e.g., Simon Baron-
Cohen 2000).22 Autism is thought to be a
deficit in this area (and related circuitry).
People with autism often have trouble figur-
ing out what other people think and believe,
and are consequently puzzled by behavior
that most people would consider normal.
One tool used in behavioral game theory is
the “ultimatum game.” In this game, a “pro-
poser” offers a division of a sum of money,
generically $10.00, to another “responder”
who can accept or reject it, ending the game.
If the responder has no emotional reaction
to the fact that the proposer is earning more
than she is (“envy” or “disgust”), then the
responder should accept the smallest offer.
If the proposer also has no emotional reac-
tion to earning more (“guilt”) and anticipates
correctly what the responder will do, then
the proposer should offer the lowest
amount. This pattern is rarely observed:
Instead, in most populations the proposer
offers 40–50 percent and about half the
responders reject offers less than 20 percent.
When players do follow the dictates of
game theory, the result can be a low payoff
and confusion. Consider this quote from an
upset subject, an Israeli college student,
whose low offer in a $10.00 ultimatum game
was rejected (from Shmuel Zamir 2000):
I did not earn any money because all the other
players are stupid! How can you reject a positive
amount of money and prefer to get zero? They
just did not understand the game! You should
have stopped the experiment and explained it to
them . . .
Ironically, while the subject’s reasoning
matches exactly how conventional game
theory approaches the game, it also sounds
autistic, because this subject is surprised
and perplexed by how normal people
behave.
This anecdote is complemented by
Elizabeth Hill and David Sally’s (2003)
extensive comparison of normal and autistic
children and adults playing ultimatum
games. Nearly half of the autistic children
offer zero or one unit (out of ten) in the ulti-
matum game, and relatively few offer half.
Many autistic adults also offered nothing,
but a large number of autistic adults offered
half—as if they had developed a reasoning
or experiential workaround which tells
them what other people think is fair in
games that involve sharing, even though
they cannot guess what others will do using
normal circuitry.
McCabe et al. (2001) used fMRI to meas-
ure brain activity when subjects played
games involving trust, cooperation, and pun-
ishment. They found that players who coop-
erated more often with others showed
increased activation in Brodmann area 10
(thought to be one part of the mind-reading
circuitry) and in the thalamus (part of the
emotional “limbic” system). Players who
cooperated less often showed no systematic
activation.
Bhatt and Camerer (in press) used fMRI
to compare brain activity when subjects
make choices and express beliefs in matrix
games. They found that when players were
in equilibrium (choices were best-responses
and beliefs were accurate), the same circuit-
ry was being used when making a choice
and expressing a belief. This means equilib-
rium is a “state of mind,” which can be iden-
tified by a tight overlap in activity in the two
tasks, as well as a mathematical restriction
on best response and belief accuracy. They
also found evidence suggesting that, when
subjects guessed what beliefs other subjects
had about their own behavior, they tended
to anchor on their own choices. This means
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23 The ACC also contains a large concentration of
“spindle cells”—large neurons shaped like spindles,
which are almost unique to human brains (Allman et al.
2002). Loosely speaking, these cells are probably impor-
tant for many of the activities which distinguish humans
from our primate cousins, particularly language, and
complex decision making.
beliefs about beliefs are not just iterations
of some belief processing mechanism;
instead, self-referential beliefs use compo-
nents of circuitry for forming beliefs and for
making choices.
5.3.2 Emotions and Visceral Effects
One of the most striking neuroscientific
findings about game theory comes from
Sanfey et al.’s (2003) fMRI study of ultima-
tum bargaining. By comparing the brains of
subjects responding to unfair ($1.00–$2.00
out of $10.00) and fair ($4.00–5.00) offers,
they found that very unfair offers differen-
tially activated three regions: Dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), anterior cingu-
late (ACC), and insula cortex (see Figure 4).
DLPFC is an area involved in planning. The
insula cortex is known to be activated during
the experience of negative emotions like
pain and disgust. ACC is an “executive func-
tion” area which often receives inputs from
many areas and resolves conflicts among
them.23 Therefore, it appears that, after an
unfair offer, the brain (ACC) struggles to
resolve the conflict between wanting to
accept the money because of its planned
reward value (DLPFC) and disliking the
“disgust” of being treated unfairly (insula).
In fact, whether players reject unfair
offers or not can be predicted rather reliably
(a correlation of 0.45) by the level of their
insula activity. It is irresistible to speculate
that the insula is a neural locus of the distaste
for inequality or unfair treatment posited by
models of social utility, which have been suc-
cessfully used to explain many varying pat-
terns in experiments — robust ultimatum
rejections, public goods contributions, and
trust and gift-exchange (e.g., Bazerman,
Loewenstein, and Leigh Thompson 1989;
24 It also suggests an intriguing follow-up experiment
that no previous theory would have predicted—patients
with damage to their insula regions should feel no disgust
and accept low offers, unless those patients have devel-
oped a “workaround” or alternative method to “feel”
unfairness in nonvisceral terms.
Ernst Fehr and Simon Gachter 2000;
Camerer 2003). The fact that unfair offers
activate insula means that a verbal statement
like “I am so disgusted about being treated
that way” is literal, not metaphorical—they
really do feel disgusted.24
Zak et al. (2003) explored the role of hor-
mones in trust games. In a canonical trust
game, one player can invest up to $10.00,
which is tripled. A second “trustee” player
can keep or repay as much of the tripled
investment as they want. Zak et al. measured
eight hormones at different points in the
trust game. The hormone with the largest
effect was oxytocin—a hormone that rises
during social bonding (such as breast-feed-
ing and casual touching). They found that
oxytocin rose in the trustee if the first player
“trusts” her by investing a lot. (They also
found that ovulating women were particular-
ly untrustworthy—they did not repay as
much of the investment.)
Roxanna Gonzalez and Loewenstein
(2004) examined the impact of circadian
rhythms in a repeated trust (centipede)
game. They sorted people into “morning”
and “night” people (which can be done
rather reliably) and had them play a cen-
tipede game when they were on- or off-peak
(e.g., the morning people were off-peak
when playing in the evening). Based on prior
research showing that sleep-cycle affects
emotional regulation—i.e., people’s ability to
suppress or avoid acting on unwanted feel-
ings—they predicted and found much lower
levels of cooperative behavior when people
played at off-peak times.
Tania Singer et al. (2004) report an impor-
tant link between reward and behavior in
games. They played repeated prisoners’
dilemma games in which one player, in the
fMRI scanner, faced a series of opponents.
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Figure 5. Coronal slices showing regions which are differentially active after an unfair offer 
($1–2 out of $10), relative to activity after a fair off ($4–5). Regions are anterior cingulate (ACC), 
right and left insula, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). See Sanfey et al. (2003).
The scanned subject was told that some
opponents cooperated intentionally (i.e.,
they could choose freely) while others coop-
erated, but unintentionally. Afterwards, sub-
jects were shown different faces of those
they had played against. The faces of the
intentional cooperators activated insula,
amygdala, and ventral striatal areas (among
others). Since the striatum is an all-purpose
reward area, activation in that region means
that simply seeing the face of a person who
intentionally cooperated with you is reward-
ing. In game theory terms, a person’s “repu-
tation” in a repeated game is a perception by
other players of their “type” or likely behav-
ior based on past play. Singer et al.’s results
mean that a good reputation may be neural-
ly encoded in a way similar to beautiful or
other rewarding stimuli.
The facts that insula activity, oxytocin lev-
els, and sleep cycles affect behavior in games,
and that cooperators’ faces “feel beautiful,”
does not “disprove” game theory, per se,
because preferences for different outcomes,
and reasoning ability, might legitimately vary
with these biological factors. The theory is
easily patched by inserting variables, like “an
envy/disgust coefficient,” which depends on
some biological state. But game theory also
assumes that players will recognize the state-
dependence in others and adjust their guess-
es about how other people will play. We have
no idea if they can, and it is likely that people
are generally limited at simulating emotional
states of others (see Leaf van Boven,
Loewenstein, and David Dunning 2003).
Cognitive inaccessibility also implies that
people may not fully understand the influ-
ence of exogenous changes in visceral
states on their own behavior. For example,
if being trusted produces oxytocin, then
when oxytocin surges for exogenous rea-
sons—from a relaxing massage, or when
synthetic oxytocin is administered—the
brain might misread this surge in oxytocin
as a sign of being trusted and react accord-
ingly (e.g., by acting in a more reciprocal
trustworthy way).
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5.3.3 Backward Induction
A central principle in game theory is
“backward induction” in extensive-form
(“tree”) games that are played over time.
Backward induction means figuring out what
to do today by and reasoning how others will
behave at all possible future points and
working backward. Behavioral evidence, and
direct evidence from measuring where play-
ers look on a computer screen, shows that
people have trouble doing more than a cou-
ple of steps of backward induction (e.g.,
Johnson et al. 2002). However, Johnson et al.
also found that, when players were briefly
instructed about how to do backward induc-
tion, they could learn to do it rapidly and
with little effort (total response times were
similar to in pre-instruction trials). This is a
reminder, in the game theory context, of the
important distinction between controlled
and automatic behavior stressed in section 3
above. Initially, subjects look automatically
at early periods and hardly notice future
periods they realize (correctly, in a statistical
sense) are unlikely to occur. However, with
instruction and practice, backward induction
quickly becames automated, yielding fast
responses and few errors.
Economists are naturally inclined to
model cognition in terms of costs and bene-
fits. If forced into this framework, backward
induction would probably be characterized
as cognitively costly. But the fact that it is
easily learned and automated suggests the
costs of backward induction has a special
structure— at first, it is unnatural (not spon-
taneously intuited by subjects), like a piece
of software not yet installed; but once
installed, it is cheap to run.
5.3.4 Learning
The idea that a game-theoretic equilibri-
um resulted from learning, imitation, or evo-
lution, rather than simple introspection, has
led to a large literature on what results in the
long-run from different types of learning
models (e.g., Drew Fudenberg and David
Levine 1998; George Mailath 1998). Since
many types of learning rules have been pro-
posed, fitting rules to data from experiment
has proved useful in showing when intuitive-
ly appealing rules might fit badly, and sug-
gesting improvements to those rules (e.g.,
Camerer 2003). Camerer and Ho (1999)
showed that both simple reinforcement of
chosen strategies, and learning by updating
beliefs about other players, are really two
polar opposite types of generalized rein-
forcement learning in which strategies have
numerical propensities or attractions which
are adjusted over time by experience.
In neural terms, the Camerer–Ho theory
can be interpreted as a splice of two process-
es—a rapid, emotional process in which a
chosen strategy is quickly reinforced by the
gain or loss that resulted and a slower delib-
erative process that requires players to cre-
ate counterfactuals about how much they
would have earned from other strategies that
were not chosen. Conventional reinforce-
ment learning neglects the second process.
“Fictitious play” belief learning assumes the
second process completely overrides the
first. A parameter in the theory which repre-
sents the relative strength of the second
process, compared to the first, is usually
estimated to be between zero and one. This
implies that reinforcement is stronger, but
both processes are at work.
Michael Platt and Paul Glimcher (1999)
found corroborating evidence for reinforce-
ment learning of the first, rapid-process sort
in single-neuron recording in monkey pari-
etal cortex. They measured neuron firing
rates in advance of choices in a game
between a monkey and a computerized
opponent. They found that firing rates are
closely related to the average reinforcement
received for that choice in the last ten trials.
Dominic Barraclough, Michelle Conroy, and
Daeyeol Lee (2004) found similar evidence
of “learning neurons” in dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex of rhesus monkeys; their
parameter estimates of learning models also
supports the two-process Camerer–Ho 
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Figure 6. ( from Glimcher et al., in press). The left graph (“before EV cue”) shows the LIP neuron firing
rate (y axis) plotted against the relative expected value of one of two possible reward-producing locations.
The right graph (“after cue”) shows the firing rate after the monkey learns which movement is rewarding.
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25 They estimate two reinforcements: When the mon-
keys choose and win (reinforcement by 1), and when they
choose and lose (2). In their two-strategy games, the
model is equivalent to one in which monkeys are not rein-
forced for losing, but the unchosen strategy is reinforced
by 2. The fact that 2 is usually less than 1 in magnitude
(see also Lee et al., in press) is equivalent to   1 in the
Camerer–Ho theory.
theory.25 Gathering neural evidence from
humans (to see whether a second, delibera-
tive process is being used as the parametric
estimates suggest) is feasible and could
prove insightful.
Figure 6 illustrates the behavior of
Glimcher’s parietal neurons in a task with
two targets of different expected value. The
left graph shows the actual firing rates (on
the y axis) plotted against the expected
reward value of the target before the “best”
target is revealed. The correspondence is
remarkably close—these neurons are encod-
ing expected value. The righthand graph
shows that, after the winning target is
revealed (so that the expected value is no
longer relevant), the firing rates increase to
close to their maximum capacity.
In sum, neuroscience provides some new
ways to think about central elements of game
theory. Strategic thinking is likely to require
specialized circuitry and iterated strategic
reasoning is likely to be bounded (as indicat-
ed by ample behavioral data). Early studies
suggest hormones and biological factors
(such as circadian rhythyms) play a role in
social preferences like trust. Thinking about
the brain—and some experimental facts—
also suggest that logical principles like back-
ward induction may be neurally unnatural
and that learning processes are likely to be a
splice of cognitive and affective processes. At
the same time, single-neuron monkey meas-
urement suggests that expected-value com-
putation and reinforcement learning may
control behavior in highly adapted tasks. The
emerging picture is one in which the simplest
elements of game theory, like keeping track
of what has worked in a mixed-equilibrium
game with limited scope for outguessing one’s
opponent, may be alive and well in the brain,
while higher-order cognition and affective
influence on social preferences depart from
the standard ideas we teach our students.
5.4 Labor-Market Discrimination
Our last specific application is labor-mar-
ket discrimination. Economic models assume
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that labor-market discrimination against
minorities is either a taste (a distaste for
working with minorities, or a distaste passed
on from customers), or a belief that minority
workers are less productive (for example, a
belief that minority status is a proxy for unob-
servable differences in skill, also known as
“statistical discrimination”).
Neuroscience suggests a different answer.
Automaticity contributes to discrimination
because neural networks rapidly spread acti-
vation through associated concepts and
stereotypes. Affect contributes to discrimina-
tion because automatic affective reactions
have such a powerful effect on cognitive judg-
ments. Discrimination in this view involves
rapid, automatic, associations between social
categories, stereotypes, and affect.
Such an account receives support from
remarkable experiments that demonstrated
subtle “implicit associations” between demo-
graphic categories and good or bad adjectives
(try it out on yourself at http://
buster.cs.yale.edu/implicit/). Subjects taking
this computer-administered implicit associa-
tion test (IAT) are shown a mixed up series of
stereotypically black or white names (Tyrone
or Chip) and positive or negative adjectives
(mother or devil). They are asked to tap one
key when they see one type of name or adjec-
tive, and a different key if they see the other
type of name or adjective, at which point the
computer moves on to the next name or adjec-
tive. The dependent variable is how long it
takes the subject to work their way through
the complete list of names and adjectives.
White subjects work their way through the list
much more quickly when one key is linked to
the pair (black or negative) and the other to
(white or positive) than they are when one key
is linked to [black or positive] and the other to
[white or negative]. What’s going on? The
brain encodes associations in neural networks,
which spread activation to related concepts.
For white students, black names are instantly
associated with negative concepts, whether
they realize it or not, because the association
is automatic (rapid and unconscious).
As the name suggest, the implicit associa-
tion test taps into “implicit,” as opposed to
“explicit,” attitudes. One can think of
implicit attitudes, roughly, as those associat-
ed with automatic processing, whereas
explicit attitudes are associated with con-
scious, controlled, processing. New meth-
ods developed by psychologists, such as the
IAT, have begun to reveal that implicit and
explicit attitudes can sometimes diverge
from one-another, with implicit attitudes, in
some cases, exerting a more reliable influ-
ence on behavior. Thus, in one recent study,
Allen McConnell and Jill Leibold (2001)
administered the IAT to subjects, had them
complete measures of explicit attitudes
toward blacks and whites, and also had them
interact with two experimenters, one black
and the other white. Coders blind to either
the implicit or explicit measures then coded
the subjects’ interactions with the experi-
menters, including such objective measures
as how closely the subject moved their chair
to the experimenter, and the experimenter
also rated their perception of the prejudice
of the subject. Although the experimenters
ratings of the subjects’ degree of prejudice
correlated with both explicit (r = 0.33, p 
0.05) and implicit (r = 0.39, p  0.05) meas-
ures, the other behavioral measures of bias
that correlated with either the IAT or self-
reports of prejudice (these were: coders’
overall ratings, speaking time, smiling,
speech errors, speech hesitation, and extent
of extemporaneous social comments) all
correlated with the IAT but not with the
explicit measures of prejudice.
Implicit attitudes have also been linked to
neural processing. In one study (Elizabeth
Phelps et al. 2000), researchers adminis-
tered the IAT to Caucasian subjects and also
asked them explicit questions about their
attitudes toward African–Americans. Then
they scanned the subjects’ brains with fMRI
while exposing them to photographs of unfa-
miliar black and white males, and focusing
specifically on a subcortical structure in the
brain called the amygdala, which numerous
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studies have linked to processing of fear.
They found that the relative strength of
amygdala activation to black as compared
with white faces was correlated with the IAT
measure of implicit attitudes, but not with
direct, conscious, expression of race atti-
tudes. (A study by Hart et al. (2000) suggests
the effect is roughly symmetric for black
subjects seeing white faces.) Furthermore,
the same pattern was not observed when the
black and white faces were well known, pos-
itively regarded, celebrities (such as Michael
Jordan and Denzel Washington). People
hold implicit attitudes involving not only
race, but also a wide range of other individ-
ual characteristics, such as height, weight,
attractiveness, religion, and national origin,
and, like race, many of these attitudes
undoubtedly have real economic conse-
quences. Thus, although most people reject
height and attractiveness as indicators of
marginal productivity, taller and more attrac-
tive people are more likely to earn higher
wages (e.g., Nicola Persico, Andrew
Postlewaite, and Dan Silverman 2002) and
other rewards (e.g., the U.S. Presidency).
Does the implicit association view imply
that labor-market discrimination is due to a
taste, a statistical shortcut, or something
else? One piece of evidence suggests the sta-
tistical interpretation is on the right track:
the amygdala that is active when people see
other-race faces seems to be sensitive to
familiarity of faces, not race per se (Dubois
et al. 1999). This is consistent with an inter-
pretation of statistical discrimination in
which employers do not fear minority work-
ers, they are simply less sure of their abilities.
But other evidence suggests discrimination
is “something else.” Amygdala activity can be
dampened if subjects are shown pictures of
black and white faces and asked to judge
how much the pictured people like vegeta-
bles (Wheeler and Fiske 2005). This suggests
that automatic reactions to race can be
erased (or substituted for) depending on the
question being asked when the faces are per-
ceived. These reactions respond to variables
other than prices and choice sets so it is a
stretch to think of them of as conventional
tastes or beliefs.
6. Conclusions
Economics parted company from psychol-
ogy in the early twentieth century.
Economists became skeptical that basic psy-
chological forces could be measured without
inferring them from behavior (the same posi-
tion “behaviorist” psychologists of the 1920s
reached), which led to adoption of the useful
tautology between unobserved utilities and
observed (revealed) preferences. But
remarkable advances in neuroscience now
make direct measurement of thoughts and
feelings possible for the first time, opening
the “black box” which is the building block of
any economic interaction and system—the
human mind.
Most economists are curious about neuro-
science, but instinctively skeptical that it can
tell us how to do better economics. The tra-
dition of ignoring psychological regularity in
making assumptions in economic theory is
so deeply ingrained—and has proved rela-
tively successful—that knowing more about
the brain seems unnecessary. Economic the-
ory will chug along successfully for the next
few years paying no attention at all to neuro-
science (just as it paid little attention to psy-
chology until recently). But it is hard to
believe that some neuroscientific regularities
will not help explain some extant anomalies,
particularly those that have been debated
for decades.
Indeed, in many areas of economics there
are basic constructs or variables at the heart
of current debates which can be usefully
thought of as neural processes, and studied
using fMRI and other tools. For example,
finance is a field awash in literally millions of
observations of daily price movements.
Despite having widespread access to terrific
data, after decades of careful research there
is no agreed-upon theory of why stock prices
fluctuate, why people trade, and why there
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are so many actively managed mutual funds
despite poor fund performance. Perhaps
knowing more about basic neural mecha-
nisms that underlie conformity, attention
paid to large price changes, wishful thinking,
sense-making of random series, and percep-
tions of expertise can help explain these 
puzzles (e.g., Lo and Repin 2002).
Furthermore, some scholars have argued
that large fluctuations in stock prices are
due to reasonable time-variation of risk pre-
mia. But there is no theoretical basis in
finance for why attitudes toward risk would
vary over time. Maybe neuroscience can
supply one.
In labor markets, a major puzzle is why
wages are so downward sticky. Firms say they
are afraid to cut wages because they want to
maintain worker morale (e.g., Truman
Bewley 2002); and experiments show that
when worker productivity is valuable, paying
a high wage induces effort, even when work-
ers are free to shirk (Fehr and Gachter
2000). Presumably morale is some combina-
tion of workers’ emotional feelings toward
their employer and may be very sensitive to
recent experience, to what other workers
think, to whether wage cuts are “procedural-
ly just,” and so forth. There is no reason
these processes could not be described as
neural processes and studied that way.
There are many anomalies in intertempo-
ral choice. In the United States, credit card
debt is substantial ($5,000.00 per household)
and a million personal bankruptcies have
been declared in each of several years
(Laibson, Andrea Repetto, and Jeremy
Tobacman 1998). Healthier food is cheaper
and more widely available than ever before,
but spending on dieting and obesity are both
on the rise. Surely understanding how brain
mechanisms process reward, and curb or
produce compulsion, and their evolutionary
origins (e.g., Trent Smith 2003) might help
explain these facts and shape sensible policy
and regulation.
Prevailing models of advertising assume
that ads convey information or signal a
product’s quality or, for “network” or “sta-
tus” goods, a product’s likely popularity.
Many of these models seem like strained
attempts to explain effects of advertising
without incorporating the obvious intuition
that advertising taps neural circuitry of
reward and desire.
Finally, economic models do not provide a
satisfying theory of how individuals differ. As
laymen, we characterize other people as
impulsive or deliberate, stable or neurotic,
decisive or indecisive, mature or immature,
foolish or wise, depressed or optimistic, scat-
terbrained or compulsively organized. The
consumers who spend countless dollars on
self-help, “organize your life” manuals, and
who sustain the huge, and infinitely varied
psychological counseling industry, are typi-
cally unhappy where they stand on some of
these dimensions and are looking for ways to
change. Comparative economic develop-
ment, entrepreneurial initiative and innova-
tion, business cycle sensitivity, and other
important macroeconomic behaviors are
probably sensitive to the distribution of these
and other psychological “assets.” Yet there is
no complete way to discuss them with the
language of beliefs and desires, which is the
only language operating in quadrant I.
6.1 Can Neuroscience Save Rational
Choice Economics?
Many neuroscientists are now using the
most basic elements of rational choice theo-
ry to explain what they see. Ironically, they
are taking up rational choice theory at the
same time as more and more economists are
moving away from rational choice toward a
behavioral view anchored in limits on ration-
ality, willpower, and greed (which we expect
to be informed by neural detail). For exam-
ple, neuroscientific studies of simple reward
circuitry in rats and primates vindicate some
of the simplest ideas of economics—namely,
a “common brain currency” which permits
substitution (Shizgal 1999), existence of neu-
rons which encode expected reward (see
Glimcher 2002 and Figure 3), and revealed
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preference (macaques viewing socially val-
ued images, see Deaner, Khera, and Platt
2005). Other groups are using Bayesian
models. One study concluded that “the cen-
tral nervous system therefore employs
[Bayesian] probabilistic models during sen-
sorimotor learning” (Konrad Körding and
Daniel Wolpert 2004).
Our view is that establishing a neural basis
for some rational choice principles will not
necessarily vindicate the approach as widely
applied to humans. The reason is that the
studies which have most clearly established
expected-value and Bayesian encoding use
simple tasks which monkeys and humans are
well-evolved to perform (e.g., reaching to
earn a juice reward). It is quite possible that
simple rational mechanisms are neurally
instantiated to do these tasks well. But the
most important kinds of economic behavior
involve manipulating abstract symbols, think-
ing about groups of people and complex
institutions, trading off very different types of
rewarding objects across time, and weighing
them by probabilities which are not always
learnable by experience. Ironically, rational
choice models might therefore be most use-
ful in thinking about the simplest kinds of
decisions humans and other species make—
involving perceptual tradeoffs, motor move-
ments, foraging for food, and so forth—and
prove least useful in thinking about abstract,
complex, long-term tradeoffs which are the
traditional province of economic theory.
6.2 Incremental Versus Radical
Neuroeconomics
How should neuroeconomics contribute
to advances in economic analysis? In the
short-run, an “incremental” approach in
which psychological evidence suggests func-
tional forms will help enhance the realism of
existing models. For example, the two-
parameter “ß–δ“ hyperbolic discounting
approach (where ß expresses preference for
immediacy, and is equal to one in the stan-
dard model) is an example that has proven
productive theoretically (e.g., Laibson,
Repetto and Tobacman 1998; O’Donoghue
and Rabin 1999). Laibson’s (2001) model of
homeostatic response to environmental cues
in addiction is an incremental model well
grounded in recent neuroscience.
However, we believe that in the long run a
more “radical” departure from current theo-
ry will become necessary, in the sense that
the basic building blocks will not just consist
of preferences, constrained optimization and
(market or game-theoretic) equilibrium.
After all, the point of constrained optimiza-
tion is to model behavior precisely and pre-
dict how behavior changes in response to
changes in budget constraints and prices.
There is no reason other models starting
from a very different basis could not be con-
structed, while also predicting behavioral
responses to constraints and prices, and pre-
dicting responses to other variables as well.
Furthermore, thinking about the brain does
not so much “falsify” rational choice theories
as suggest entirely new distinctions and
questions.
For example, is learning that a particular
person cooperated with you in a game
encoded as a cognitive reputational statistic
about that person, like a numerical test score,
or a “warm glow” which produces a surge of
dopamine when you see the person’s face
(Singer et al. 2004; cf. James Rilling et al.
2002). Standard game theory has no answer
for this question. But the distinction matters.
If reputations are encoded dopaminergically,
then they may spill over across groups of
people who look the same, for example, or
who are perceived as being part of a group
who behave similarly (Bill McEvily et al.
2003; Paul Healy 2004). Or the mechanism
can work in reverse—since attractive faces
are known to produce dopaminergic surges
(Aharon et al. 2001), the cortex may mistake
these positive signals of cooperativeness
(which also produces pleasurable sensations)
and automatically judge attractive faces as
likely to be cooperative. This simple neural
question about reward spillover might form
the foundation of group affiliation and social
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26 Thanks to Nava Ashraf for clarifying this point.
capital and have something to do with why
some countries are rich and others poor.
Our main theme in this paper is that radi-
cal models should respect the fact that brain
mechanisms combine controlled and auto-
matic processes, operating using cognition
and affect. The Platonic metaphor of reason
as a charioteer, driving twin horses of passion
and appetite, is on the right track—except
reason has its hands full with headstrong
passions and appetites.26 Of course, the chal-
lenge in radical-style theorizing is to develop
models of how multiple mechanisms interact
which are precise. Can this be done? The
answer is Yes. Bernheim and Rangel (2004),
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2004), and
Jess Benhabib and Alberto Bisin (2002) have
all proposed recent models with interacting
mechanisms much like those in our Table 1.
Furthermore, while interactions of multi-
ple brain mechanisms might appear to be
too radical a change from equilibrium with
utility maximization, we think many familiar
tools can be used to do radical neuroeco-
nomics. Interactions of cognition and affect
might resemble systems like supply and
demand, or feedback loops which exhibit
multiple equilibria. The interaction of con-
trolled and automatic processes might be
like an inventory policy or agency model in
which a controller only steps in when an
extreme state of the system (or unusual
event) requires controlled processes to
override automatic ones. The influence of
affect on choices is a very general type of
state-dependence (where the “state” is
affective, and is influenced by external cues
and also by internal deliberation and
restraint). Instead of solving for equilibria in
these interacting-mechanism models, solve
for steady states or cyclic fluctuations.
Instead of summarizing responses to
changes by comparative statics, study
impulse-response functions.
Although we focused solely on applications
of neuroscience to economics, intellectual
trade could also flow in the opposite direc-
tion. Neuroscience is shot through with
familiar economic language — delegation,
division of labor, constraint, coordination,
executive function — but these concepts are
not formalized in neuroscience as they are in
economics. There is no overall theory of how
the brain allocates resources that are essen-
tially fixed (e.g., blood flow and attention).
An “economic model of the brain” could help
here. Simple economic concepts, like mech-
anisms for rationing under scarcity, and gen-
eral versus partial equilibrium responses to
shocks, could help neuroscientists under-
stand how the entire brain interacts. At a
technical level, neuroscientists are using
tools imported from econometrics, such as
Granger causality (e.g., Wolfram Hesse et al.
2003), to draw better inferences from neural
time series. Finally, as the center of gravity in
neuroscience research shifts from elemen-
tary cognitive processes to the study of so-
called higher functions—reasoning, social
inference, and decision making—neurosci-
entists will increasingly reference, and draw
inspiration from, the conceptual apparatus of
economics, a unique distillate of our century-
long reflection on individual and strategic
behavior.
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